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Legislation in Legal Imagination:
Introductory Exercises
PATRICK

0.

GUDRIDGE*

A sense of disappointment is evident in much recent writing
about statutory construction. The jurisprudence of statutes, the
theory of how the products of legislative processes figure in legal
analysis, remains only peripheral. It asserts no claim to the central
place in our thinking that we would have been prepared to grant
it.' But in the face of this failure, what conclusion should we draw?
If theories of statutory interpretation have not succeeded, perhaps the explanation lies less in some in-built "unanalyzability" in
statutes, and more in the images that predispose our theorizing,
the expectations we hold concerning the appearance a successful
theory should present.' We tend to assume that, if statutes are to
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law; I am grateful to Ken Casebeer, Paul
Dean, John Gaubatz, Michael Graham, Dennis Lynch, Jim Mofsky, and Mark Tushnet for
their representations, suggestions, and criticisms. The approach and conclusions of this essay, however, are peculiarly my own.
1. The failure of statutory interpretation to emerge as a primary topic of legal thought
was an implicit subject of the important 1950 Vanderbilt symposium. A Symposium on
Statutory Construction, 3 VAan. L. REV. 365 (1950). The cheerfulness of Justice Frankfurter's Foreword does not entirely obscure the underlying stoicism of his argument. See
Frankfurter, Foreword, id. at 365-67. Many of the essays published in the symposium were
more obvious in acknowledging the surprisingly primitive state of the art in statutory jurisprudence, e.g., MacDonald, The Position of Statutory Construction in Present Day Law
Practice, id. at 369 ("The growing volume and complexity of legislation have increased the
responsibility of the practitioner year by year, but adequate and organized aids for the discovery and construction of that legislation have not been provided"); the merely conventional role of traditional rules of construction, e.g., Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, id.
at 401-06; and a general sense of dissatisfaction, e.g., Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation,id. at 382 ("Judges, practicing attorneys and law professors all have echoed basic dissatisfaction with the operation and application of the rules of
statutory interpretation").
For recent accounts of the decline of statutory interpretation, incorporating post-1950
developments, see Weisburg, The CalabresianJudicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal
Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213-16 (1983); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 892-98
(1982).
2. The sense that efforts at statutory interpretation are often artifacts-expressions of
theoretical predispositions more than reactions to statutes themselves-is commonplace in
recent critical writing. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 533, 536
(1983) ("too often the meaning of a statute is smuggled into the rules that determine when,
and why, to cut off debate"); Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory:
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be interesting subjects of analysis, any theory identifying their relevant features should reveal those features as susceptible of a suffi-

ciently detailed description to be jurisprudentially useful. However
innocuous this prerequisite might be in isolation, we frequently

complicate the task of satisfying it by setting up two additional
demands. Attempts to characterize (to describe the proper form
for) statutory analysis often appear to suppose that an appropriate
characterization must be unifying. It must identify a common element cutting across the full (or at least a large) range of statutes.
Such attempts often also seem to postulate that a successful characterization would identify a feature of statutes that is not only
"detailed" and "common" but also "objective"-in the sense of being obviously of pre-interpretive origin, truly a part of a statute
"itself."'
Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 676, 680-88 (1979).
3. A substantial body of recent writing indirectly confirms my characterization of the
attributes we commonly expect theories of statutory interpretation to display. This work
has in common a distinctive "negative" structure. It treats statutes or traditional modes of
interpretation as "lacking" desired qualities and looks to some other set of legal materials to
fill the absence. The virtues that the writers find in the "other" regime, of course, are also a
measure of the (disappointed) expectations they hold concerning statutes.
Not all of this work rejects traditional statutory analysis entirely-at least not at first
glance. Thus, Professor Calabresi addresses the apparently narrow problem of "obsolete"
statutes and argues that courts, in the face of such out-of-date legislation, should refer to
common law values instead. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
Professor Tribe discusses only statutory "silences"; constitutional law, he believes, is a more
appropriate source of responses to legislative failures to act than any statutory analysis per
se. Tribe, Toward A Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and
ConstitutionalSilence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982). And Professor Easterbrook's subject is the
limits on the reach of particular statutes. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 533. He argues that
references to statutory language or legislative intent are less satisfactory means of identifying those limits than an independent "metatheory" of statutory application. Easterbrook's
own meta-attempt emphasizes, inter alia, an analogy linking legislatures and parties to contracts; an analogy that leads Easterbrook to frame an ex ante inquiry into the costs and
benefits of various rules of construction governing statutory limits. See id. at 540-51.
It is not difficult to see that Calabresi, Tribe, and Easterbrook regard the relevance of
their alternative references as more or less independent of particular statutory contexts-as
applied in particular situations but not wholly determined by those situations. Easterbrook
is explicit on this point. See id. at 535 ("a general rule of construing statutes to find their
boundaries"). The work of all three, again rather obviously, proceeds on the assumption that
the pertinent "other" regimes are capable of supplying appropriately detailed analytics. See,
e.g., Tribe, supra, at 524-28. And however careful these writers are in avoiding any naive
assertions of the absolute "groundedness" of their alternative references, compare id. at
532-35 (emphasizing incompleteness and indeterminacy of rules for construing Constitution)
with G. CALABRESI, supra at 96-101 (discussing reality of common law "legal fabric"), they
appear to be sure that one virtue of such references is their appearance of being relatively
more grounded than statutory analysis-at least in connection with questions of obsolescence, gaps, and boundaries.
In fact, although Calabresi, Tribe, and Easterbrook purport to acknowledge a place for
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Neither of these latter assumptions, at least, is genuinely necessary. In place of the bias in favor of unifying accounts, for example, we might substitute a predisposition to see difference-ask of
a theory of statutory interpretation that it acknowledge that
modes of interpretation vary in fundamental ways from statute to
statute, or even from interpreter to interpreter. Similarly, we
might set aside the notion that a theory acquires persuasive force
insofar as the features of a statute to which it refers are "really
present." We may be willing to tolerate an inability to determine
whether statutory features are simply creatures of a theory if we
can view the theory as itself possessing a measure of "objectivity."
From this perspective, we would judge the theory as a "practraditional statutory analysis, each is dubious of the power of such analysis in any event.
See, e.g., id. at 42-43, 214-16 n.30, 217 n.39; Tribe, supra, at 517. Easterbrook is again the
most explicit, arguing that one benefit of his metatheoretical approach to boundaries is the
limitation it sets on uses of traditional statutory analysis. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at
550-51. Interestingly, the negative structure organizing the arguments of these writers also
frames the discussion of several other prominent critics who have assessed statutory analysis
per se. And again, susceptibility to detailed description, general relevance, and wellgroundedness figure as at least potential virtues of the alternative regime. This mode of
organization is visible, for example, in Judge Posner's recent attempt to sketch an economics-based approach to statutory analysis. E.g., Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CH. L. REV. 800 (1983). Perhaps more surprisingly,
a similar organizing insight shapes the work of Professors Hart and Sacks, who sought to
reorient statutory analysis by holding statutory language and legislative history hostage to
ordinary linguistic usages and the legal community's prior expectations about the law's content. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1218-26, 1410-17 (1958) (unpublished manuscript); see also infra note 66.
This approach, which makes study of the readers of statutes at least as important as study
of either the writers or the statutes themselves, receives elaborate treatment in Professor
Dickerson's attempt to restate the standard vocabulary of statutory analysis in the terms of
a theory of communication giving priority to context and reader orientation. R. DICKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975). The reader's perspective dominates both sides of Dickerson's distinction between cognition and creation of statutory
meaning. Compare id. at 223 ("the meaning of a statute to the hypothetical typical member
of the legislative audience to whom it is addressed closely approximates, and thus expresses,
the subjective intent of the authors") with id. at 247 (creative judge "owes fidelity to the
coherence of the legal order"). And somewhat surprisingly, a family resemblance to the Hart
and Sacks approach may also be glimpsed in Professor Abraham's provocative juxtaposition
of statutory analysis and literary theory. Abraham, supra note 2, at 676. Abraham sees statutory content as importantly conventional, as a product of the interpreter's organizing perspective. "[T]hose who suggest that a text is an object entirely independent of its readers
are ignoring the sense in which the bedrock beliefs of its readers actually constitute the
text." Id. at 686. But he also points to the existence of the interpretative community as a
potential source of stability-as a regulator of convention. See id. To the extent that interpreters agree on the relevant conventions, Abraham conceives of a kind of ersatz objectivity.
"[F]acts are not immutable, as the objectivist would have it, nor individual or arbitrary
. . . . They do provide objectivity, however, within a community of interpretation where

they need not be questioned." Id. at 688. See generally Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982).
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tice"-of interest insofar as we can describe it as in use, or insofar
as we assert it in order to put it to use. Features of a statute thus
would become "real" because a theory in practice treated them as
such.
Of course, in the light of these revised assumptions, the normative relevance of a theory of statutory interpretation would be
less obvious. Generality and extrinsic reference, we may think, are
features of a theory that come quite close to being self-evidently
desirable. The conclusions suggested by a statutory theory possessing these features thus acquire additional credibility. By contrast,
neither acknowledgments of diversity nor depictions of an only
"practiced" objectivity trigger any similar approval reflex. An approach to statutes incorporating these elements may be conceivable. But it is not easy, at least at first glance, to see why such an
approach (or its suggested conclusions) would be desirable.
In this essay, however, I attempt to make a case for one version of such a statutory jurisprudence. I begin with the traditional
question facing the theory of statutory interpretation. Is the interpreter of a statute active, imposing a set of values in order to give
form to fundamentally malleable legislative materials, or passive,
merely providing the voice for conclusions a statute itself somehow
dictates? Either alternative, I think, is rather obviously unsatisfactory. Do interpreters really hold their values and views already
fully-formed, even before they confront statutes? Do statutes contain within themselves the results of their own application, in advance (somehow) of the process of interpretation? We might expect, rather, to see a kind of contest between interpreter and
statute, in which either or both may, by the close of analysis, go
through a process of change (respectively, of mind or of apparent
form). A statute may be what its reader makes of it, in the sense
that the reading resolves its form. And this reading may indeed
depend upon what the interpreter chooses to impute. But the reading may also reveal (more complexly) the ways in which the possibilities a statute presents influence the resolution the interpreter
chooses. For the interpreter, statutory analysis can operate as a
process of both recognition and expression. The form we attribute
to the statute serves as a means by which we represent (in order to
identify as well as to communicate) the values we hold.
Statutory analysis, therefore, may be both descriptive and precipitative of that which it describes. It is one way (among several)
that legal inquiry brings into focus and thus brings to bear the enveloping normative field. It is at the same time one way (among
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several) that legal inquiry reciprocally influences the organization
and content of this normative field. This double feature of statutory analysis, as I have reformulated it, is crucial. It suggests a
function for efforts to characterize statutes that permits such efforts to retain value (perhaps gain value) in the face not only of
normative consensus, but also transition, fundamental conflict, or
radical flux. Herein, I think, lies the justification for relaxing our
commitments to unity and objectivity.
These propositions are the underlying subject of this essay.
Nonetheless, they are not so much discussed directly as rediscovered, in the course of a series of investigations of particular
statutory analyses. Initially, I reread the Radin/Landis exchange 4-the scene for an early appearance of much modern statutory theory. Despite their differences, Radin and Landis both notably deemphasized statutes as such in their accounts of statutory
jurisprudence. Their assumption that statutes per se provide only
the backdrop for inquiry is interesting, I think, for two reasons. It
is a source of difficulty in the arguments of both Radin and Landis.
And it fixes a point of departure. What would we have to believe in
order to reject Radin and Landis, in order to recognize an important place for statutes themselves? I briefly describe the features
one such alternative theory of statutory interpretation might possess.5 (At this point the ideas I have sketched in this introduction
return momentarily to the surface.) This rather abstract summary,
however, is itself only a preliminary account. It serves as a preparation for the largest part of the essay, an examination of three
Supreme Court decisions, dating from 1982:' each the product of a
unanimous Court, but each, in differing ways, and in different substantive contexts,7 illustrative of the use of statutory analysis to
4. Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930); Landis, A Note on
"StatutoryInterpretation,"43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); see infra text accompanying notes
1-65.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
6. Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577 (1982);
United Mine Workers of America Health and Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562
(1982); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
7. The cases address a question of litigative standing under federal campaign finance

law, see infra text accompanying notes 73-133; the capacity of a collective bargaining agreement to alter pension arrangements, see infra text accompanying notes 134-98; and the definition of a "security" for purposes of antifraud litigation enforcing rule 10b-5, see infra text
accompanying notes 199-278.
I should emphasize at the outset that I do not write about these cases from the perspec-

tive, for example, of labor law or securities law insofar as such a perspective might provide
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encode controversy-to become both an expression and a means of
conflict. Finally, it will become clear that this essay is in its entirety introductory, a trial run in advance of a more ambitious project. In concluding, I describe parts of that project.
I.
Max Radin's article Statutory Interpretationbegins:
Anglo-American law is in a fair way of becoming statutory, not
by a great act of summation like the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch or
the Swiss Code, but piecemeal by the relentless annual or biennial grinding of more than fifty legislative machines. At any rate,
in a constantly increasing number of litigated cases, the point of
departure is as likely as not to be a statute, the effect of which is
to be estimated, the meaning discovered, and the applicability
affirmed or rejected.8
These two sentences point in different directions. "Anglo-American law is in a fair way of becoming statutory. . .

."

Legal study,

we might suppose, is a kind of metaphysics; recognizing, relating
(here counting) fundamental entities (here statutes). But the emphasis immediately shifts. "[T]he point of departure is as likely as
not to be a statute, the effect of which is to be estimated, the
meaning discovered, and the applicability affirmed or rejected."
The passive voice indicates consciousness: that of the estimator,
the discoverer, the applier. Statutes are subjects of consciousness,
and as such are only "points of departure." The focus is consciousness itself as it is revealed in processes of comprehension or
understanding.
Of what relevance are statutes in the process of statutory interpretation? This is not really Radin's question.9 He is interested
primarily in the role of interpretation,in the part played in lawmaking by judicial consciousness. Radin emphasizes "judicial epistemology." 10 And yet (in whatever fashion) it is to statutes that
judges react. In describing judicial consciousness, Radin cannot
an independent basis for evaluating these cases. I do reconstruct elementary themes of labor
law or securities law, for example. But because I take the three Supreme Court opinions as
starting points, and because I first explore formal aspects of their treatment of statutory
interpretation, the versions of substantive law that I project may differ in various ways from
the pictures that practitioners in the given fields frequently invoke.
8.Radin, supra note 4, at 863.
9. In a subsequent article, Radin discussed more explicitly the subject of statutes as
such. Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. Rav. 388 (1942); see infra note 50.
10. Radin, supra note 4, at 865.
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help but refer, if only casually, to statutes themselves. Implicit in
these references lies some sort of characterization, a legislative
metaphysics. In any event, I propose to take seriously Radin's offhand images and allusions, to recover and re-present as a systematic scheme his attributions. I will, therefore, "misread" Statutory
Interpretation:describe it in a fashion that gives priority to what
was for Radin merely background (the statutory references) and
subordinates (treats mostly as context) his main point-the "real"
importance of judicial sensibility. But the distortion, I think, is
only superficial. Once we become aware of Radin's way with statutes, we can see that in an important sense his particular picture
of judicial consciousness is in fact "really" an artifact, dependent
importantly upon his background constructions. Moreover, we can
also see that Radin's attributions, while constitutive for his larger
analysis, are, once they become prominent, obviously deceptive:
they obscure rather than clarify our sense of statutes as such.
A.
Statutory Interpretation,as I read it, is first of all an analysis
of the usual doctrines that courts invoke in construing statutes.
Legislative intent provides the unifying principle for the traditional system. The plain meaning rule, maxims of construction,
references to legislative history, all such forms of analysis find
their justification as means of divining legislative intent. But legislative intent, Radin argues, is a "monster."' 1 "A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which
two or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected,
and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have
had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs. "'i Legislatures simply "[utter] the words of a statute";" they
"make statements in general terms of undesirable and desirable
situations . . . ."" Statutes are "words." Doctrines of statutory
construction must be judged as means of finding the meaning of
words. As indicators of meaning, Radin argues, traditional approaches are hopelessly defective. Prospective, general statutes are
almost inevitably indeterminate; plain meanings are thus rare."
Maxims of construction are either vacuous or contrary to ordinary
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 872; see id. at 869-72.
Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
Id.
See id. at 867-69.
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usage. 6 Legislative history, in the strict sense, is usually
7
ambiguous.'
Radin's replacement of legislative intent with the idea of statutes as words is also central to the positive argument of Statutory
Interpretation.Traditional doctrines, Radin concludes, are "cardboard structures"; 8 their role in legal analysis is little more than
that of post hoc rationalization.' 9 The consequences of alternative
decisions, and the values attached to the various contingencies, are
in fact the chief considerations relevant in matters of statutory interpretation. Radin defends at length the "competent calculus of
probable consequences"2 0 that takes place behind the "smoke
screen.""' But as he acknowledges, the jurisprudence of results is
at best an incomplete theory of statutory interpretation. It assigns
no role whatsoever to statutes themselves: "[Clourts act in the case
of statutes as they act when no statute is in question. 2 2 To correct
this deficiency, Radin returns to the idea of statutes as words.
"Words are certainly not crystals, as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely
and properly warned us, but they are after all not portmanteaus.
We can not quite put anything we like into them.""
In the end, however, Radin reaches much the same conclusion
about straightforward inquiries into the meaning of words as he
had earlier reached concerning the more rococo techniques of
traditional statutory interpretation. There is, of course, the purpose of a statute, "evident in the character of the thing itself," independent of any fictional legislative intent.2 4 "[I]t is rare indeed
that we can not say positively what any particular statute is for, by
reading it." 5 Even without regard to purpose, the meaning of the
words of a statute will fix "a maximum and a minimum of extension. .

.

. apparent to any intelligent person reading the statute

16. See id. at 873-75, 880.
17. See id. at 873. Although Radin briefly mentions "debates in the legislature," his
discussion of legislative history emphasizes efforts to draw conclusions from the content of
the "[s]uccessive drafts of a statute." Id. Presumably, Radin's critique of the idea of legislative intent disposes of references to legislative debates. See id. at 869-72.
18. Id. at 885.
19. Id. at 880.
20. Id. at 885.
21. Id. at 882.
22. Id. at 878.
23. Id. at 866; see id. at 878-79.
24. Id. at 875. "So, a razor is something to shave with, and we should know this without
the least speculation as to the ideas which were in the manufacturer's mind when the razor
was made." Id. at 875-76.
25. Id. at 876.
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,"26 Nevertheless, statutory purposes are not likely to be
unique. "[N]early every end is a means to another end. ' 27 Similarly, statutory language will often leave "a large choice between a
maximum and a minimum of extension. 2 s Radin is left with the
jurisprudence of results at the center of his theory of statutory interpretation. "The statute-the lex lata-creates limits on both
sides of strictness and liberality, 2' 2 but the limits are so broad that
ordinarily it will be the choice, and not the limits, that matters.
....

B.
What does it mean to say that statutes are "words"? Radin's
usage varies. He frequently refers to "statutes" and "words" interchangeably.80 Occasionally, he characterizes statutes as particular
forms of words: statements, 1 descriptions, 2 or commands.as Indeed, at one point, Radin distinguishes between statutes as descriptions and statutes as commands.3 4 But where he means to be
precise, Radin employs a distinction between "determinable" and
"determinate," treating statutes as "determinables":
The situation described in a statute is generally a determinable;
that is to say, it is a statement which involves a number of possible events or individualizations, any one of which would be correctly described by that determinable. A determinable of this
sort can be made more nearly determinate by reducing the number of possible individualizations, and it becomes quite determinate when it is so expressed that there is only one.'
This distinction formally summarizes Radin's dichotomy of general
descriptions and unique events, which underlies his central argument about statutory ambiguity:
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 879.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 882.
See, e.g., id. at 863 ("the wording of enactments"). "[Wie

may not disregard

[words] in statutes. The real question in statutory interpretation is just what we shall do
with them." Id. at 866.
31. See, e.g., id. at 871 (legislators "make statements in general terms of undesirable
and desirable situations").
32. See, e.g., id. at 868 ("a group of events is described in a statute").

33. See, e.g., id. at 876 (a statute "asserts that something is to be done").
34. See id. ("whatever uncertainty . . . may exist as to the conditions under which it
should be done, as a rule there is none as to the situation which the conditions are to give
rise to").
35. Id. at 868.
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[A statute] . . . is a statement of a situation, or rather of a
group of possible events within a situation, and as such is essentially ambiguous. . . . If. . . a group of events is described in a
statute, there must be at least two which will fit that description, and since events are unique, any description of a group is
almost by definition ambiguous.3 6
This distinction also explains Radin's ordinary treatment of statutes and words as interchangeable. "Determinate" not only assigns
to the statute generality and thus ambiguity; it also conflates such
terms as statement, description, or command, redefining statutes
at the level of category or variable. General, ambiguous, categorical-Radin also associates these features with words, at least as a
matter of tendency:
If there is a glaring contradiction between what the judge thinks
desirable and what the great majority of the community so considers, the community must, in its legislative function, limit as
carefully as it can by more easily determinable categories the
range within which the judge shall select his desirables. But the
legislature can not both have its cake and eat it. It can not indulge itself in using large, round, sonorous words and then complain that courts do not treat them as precise, definite, and
87
unreverberant.
The whole possesses no features (or at least no relevant feature) not possessed by its parts: statutes are words. Metaphysically, the equation is appealing. After all, statutes really are just
words. But words are not just things. Words have a meaning, function as signs, refer to other things. The fact that words have meaning is Radin's starting point, both in criticizing traditional doctrine
as an inadequate key to meaning, and in arguing that statutes, inherently ambiguous in meaning, must inevitably play only a limiting role in statutory interpretation." Radin's argument thus requires him to treat as metaphysical, as fundamental characteristics
of the object itself, certain features of words as signs, notably their
character as categories and thus their tendency to generality and
ambiguity. But the features of words as signs that play a part in
Radin's argument are not inevitably fundamental. They are merely
artifacts of one way of using words, by-products of a particular
theory of expression and comprehension. Radin's metaphysic is not
36. Id.

37. Id. at 884.

38. See, e.g., id. at 876-79, 880-82.
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as "realistic" as it first seems. An epistemological
in our view of how words work-may precipitate
revolution.
In fact, it cannot be that statutes are just
words, as we encounter them, are not just words,

shift-a change
a metaphysical
words, because
an aggregate or

jumble. The idea of words as such is an abstraction. Nor do we
encounter words as language. "Language" refers to our theory of
the most general logic underlying the use of words, to our description of the full set of combinational possibilities, and not to a theory of the use of words as such. 9 A theory of this latter sort might
invoke ideas of style or dominant combinations. 0 But first of all,
such a theory would recognize that the use of words presupposes
that there are indeed means for putting words to use. 4' For example, we might, with Derrida, take seriously the differences between
uses of words in speech and writing. 42 This seemingly elementary
distinction may be especially interesting for present purposes: Radin, it turns out, clearly ignores it. He treats statutes or the process
39. See, e.g., F.

DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

9-15 (trans. ed. 1959).

40. I have discussed this possibility elsewhere. See Gudridge, The Persistence of Classical Style, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 663 (1983).
41. It is important to distinguish between two ways we refer to uses of words. Sometimes we treat usage as a source of meaning; we assume that there are settled ways of inferring from context the specific meaning of an otherwise ambiguous word. For example, in his
essay reexamining the Radin/Landis debate, Gerald MacCallum developed an elaborate contextual analysis, suggesting that the existence of various conventions of legislative and judicial procedure, if known and followed by both legislators and judges, might make both the
idea of legislative intent more plausible and the substance of such intent more identifiable
than Radin had assumed. Courts could thus usefully resort to legislative intent in order to
give statutes content. See MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966). Yet, as
Professor MacCallum acknowledged, the stability and particularity of the conventions or
"context" that his analysis supposed could not be taken for granted. See id. at 785, 786-87.
In general, theories of meaning that refer to context may be notable (and vulnerable) because of the degree to which they must make assumptions about the stability of social environments. See, e.g., S. KRIPKE, WITrGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRivATE LANGUAGE 96-98
(1982).
We also refer to "uses" of words in a way that implicates but does not purport to resolve questions of meaning. The emphasis here is on "forms of use"-devices for organizing
uses of words. Such devices may define part of the context from which the meaning of words
becomes apparent, and thus can hardly be considered truly neutral instruments of communication. But forms of use, we tend to think, are relatively open to choice and adjustment:
perhaps establish a moving context, rather than the fixed context that direct "meaning as
use" theories tend to suppose. An emphasis on forms of use may suggest that the meaning
of statutory words is something that is caught up in a process or dynamic, always more or
less established, and that disagreement about the meaning of such words is something describable in terms more revealing than essentially binary references to the "success" or "failure" of efforts at categorization. Or so I assume: much of this essay is an attempt to put to
work the ideas of "forms of use" and "moving context."

42. See, e.g., J.

DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY

(trans. ed. 1976).
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of legislating as a form of speech: "When the legislature has uttered the words of a statute .. .";s "The fondness of the draftsman for a special locution . . .;44 "large, round, sonorous words"; 45
etc. The analytical forms that Radin attributes to statutes-statement, description, command-are all typically forms of
sentences that we ordinarily associate more with speaking than
writing. In addition, the statutes to which Radin refers for illustration, if not matters of common legal knowledge, like the Statute of
Frauds, 46 are all capable of one sentence summary: "A statute
which declares gambling contracts to be void . . .,,;47
"a statute

making murder capital

...- ;48

"the many statutes in Western

states granting a bounty for coyote scalps. '' 49 Is there a connection
here, a link between the tendency to see statutes as speech and to
see statutes as simple? In any event, it is a fact that statutes are
not literally speech. Legislatures, whatever else they are, are not
choirs. Statutes are a form of writing.
Is this the idea that we should take literally, subjecting statutes to the modes of analysis that we reserve for other writings qua
writings? The statute would itself become the relevant object, a
text, and the characteristics of the statute as a literary form would
become the relevant metaphysical attributes. Epistemology would
become hermeneutics, a theory of the relationship of text and
meaning. We are left, then, to redefine statutory form, and thereby
to make sense of perhaps the only plausible metaphysical state0
ment: statutes are statutes.5
43. Radin, supra note 4, at 871.
44. Id. at 873.
45. Id. at 884.
46. See id. at 877, 879.
47. Id. at 876.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 879 n.31.
50. In his later essay, Radin saw statutes as essentially reducing to two components.
See Radin, supra note 9, at 394-408. The first was the statute's purpose: "the specific result
that can reasonably be taken to be what the statute is striving to attain." Id. at 408. The
second was an "instrumental or implemental part." Id. at 399. These "means which the
statute indicates for achieving its purpose . . . usually constitute the major portion of the
statute." Id. Such statutory mechanics may either expedite "the activity of courts and officials by making it clear when and how they must act," or reveal that the statutory "goal is
to be achieved, but not in any and every fashion and at the sacrifice of other values worth
protection." Id. Statutory interpretation became for Radin a process of judicial or administrative identification of statutory purpose, evaluation of the purpose's merit, and judgment
about the limits of statutory mechanics, properly acknowledging both a legislature's own
expressed hesitancy in pursuing its aim and any doubt the interpreter might feel as well.
See id. at 422.
Radin's approach in this second essay is vulnerable to several criticisms. It assumes that
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II.
This conclusion, however, is premature. The features of statutory words that Radin emphasizes have to do with the function
(for Radin, usually failure) of words as classifiers, as categories-as
rules. But if he treats rule application as the model for the process
by which a statute (if only sometimes) itself resolves questions of
meaning, it is because Radin has first of all separated statutory
words from any systematic relationship with the idea (a metaphysical "monster") of legislative intent. James Landis, in his critique
of Radin, 1 purported to rehabilitate the idea of legislative intent,
in a way that not only restored that idea's plausibility, but also
removed any need to see the process of statutory interpretation as
involving exercises (whether successful or unsuccessful) in rule application per se:
The so-called rules of interpretation are not rules that automatically reach results but ways of attuning the mind to a vision
comparable to that possessed by the legislature. The vision of
itself rarely actually grasps the particular determinate, but the
eye once aligned in the same direction will more probably place
a particular determinate in its appropriate spot."2
Landis is obviously making an important argument.58 If his apsome single statutory purpose is usually apparent. "Generally it is unmistakable." Id. at 398.
In his earlier essay, however, Radin had demonstrated the elasticity of the "purpose" notion. See Radin, supra note 4, at 875-79. In A Short Way with Statutes, Radin also requires
judicial or administrative interpreters to accept the legislative choice of purpose. "The legislature that put the statute on the books had the constitutional right and power to set this
purpose as a desirable one for the community, and the court or administrator has the undoubted duty to obey it." Radin, supra note 9, at 398. But he permits the interpreters to
take into account their own attitudes about the legislative purpose in dealing with questions
of statutory mechanics. Radin seems to believe that this indirect subversion can have only a
limited effect. It will figure only in a decision about whether to look beyond a statute's own
enforcement mechanisms in order to pursue the statute's purpose. See id. at 422. But this
view apparently presumes that statutory mechanics, like purposes, are clear. If not (and
Radin remains skeptical of the definitional effectiveness of statutory language, see, e.g., id.
at 406), the dissenting interpreter can easily purport to accept a statute's purpose while in
fact working to frustrate it.
51. Landis, supra note 4, at 886.
52. Id. at 892.
53. Traces of Landis's approach reappear in more recent writing about statutory interpretation. For example, the Hart and Sacks Legal Process materials parallel Radin's later
essay in emphasizing statutory purpose, compare H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 3, at 1411,
1413-17, with Radin, supra note 9, at 407-10, but discuss statutory purpose within a theoretical framework that first establishes point of view-Landis's sense of "mind" and "vision,"
see Landis, supra note 4, at 892-as primary, see, e.g., H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra, at 1410
(outline heading: "The Mood in Which the Task Should Be Done') (emphasis in original).
Unlike Radin, Hart and Sacks are thus able to refer to a statutory purpose without needing
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proach works, we need not concern ourselves with the deficiencies
in Radin's account of statutes as words. The statute itself within
the Landis scheme is always secondary: at most evidence of legislative intent; otherwise mere surface, below or behind which the real
analysis takes place. We will see, however, that if we look closely at
the Landis approach, its efforts to create an alternative to Radin
end up as unsatisfactory. Indeed, the Landis analysis ultimately
resembles the Radin approach. Both simplify statutory form, in
the course of arguments that remind us that such simplification is
troubling.
A.
Landis would rehabilitate the idea of legislative intent by first
distinguishing between judges as individuals and the judicial role.
Drawing on the constitutional principle of separation of powers,
Landis states the rule of construction that courts should carry out
legislative intent as the definition of the judicial office in statutory
construction cases:
The Anglo-American scheme of government conceives of lawgivers apart from and at times paramount over courts. Such a function, commonly vested in a legislature, presupposes an intelligible method of making known to the organs of administration,
courts or otherwise, its desires and hopes. That method centuries ago crystallized into the formalism of passing statutes. It is
from such a conception that one derives the rule of statutory
4
interpretation emphasizing the intent of the passer of statutes.
For individual judges, therefore, the intent rule acquires an ethical
cast: judges as individuals, as part of their responsibility to be true
to their role, assume an obligation to construe statutes so as to give
effect to legislative intent. "When the intent or meaning of the legislature is discoverable, statutory interpretation posits no serious
problem except the political one of insistence upon judicial
humility." 55 By stating the intent rule in ethical form, Landis is
able to acknowledge the ambiguity of traditional techniques of
to treat such a purpose as always (or almost always) self-evident. See, e.g., id. at 1413-17.
Some of Landis's arguments have so far acquired the status of "common property" that
they are used even by authors who do not regard point of view as crucial. Compare Landis,
supra note 4, at 888-90, with J.W. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 37 (1982) (attention to
legislative procedures as solution to problem of legislative intent). Concerning Hurst's divergence from Landis, see infra note 65.
54. Landis, supra note 4, at 886.
55. Id. at 891.
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statutory construction as means of gauging legislative intent without diminishing the force of his argument." The separation of
powers requires of judges fidelity to legislative intent as "an attitude of mind. '5 7 Even if techniques of construction sometimes fail
to reveal legislative intent per se, judges who resort to such techniques do not act outside their office so long as they act in the
proper spirit. Indeed, techniques of construction, even if faulty,
may be of value to judges precisely because their use helps to create the proper orientation:
The despised rules of expressio unius exclusio alterius, presumptions of strict and liberal interpretation, are of this character. They predicate attitudes of mind more likely to recreate the
atmosphere surrounding the statute in its passage and thus
more likely to give effect accurately to the real legislative
purpose.58
Landis repeatedly acknowledges that rules of construction and
methods of identifying legislative intent "solve only the obvious
case," and otherwise merely "give a direction for profitable thinking." ' 9 "Of course, guessing will not thereby be eliminated; but
what science, natural or otherwise, has eliminated the necessity of
guesswork?" 0 Judges committed to the idea of respect for legislative intent are free to treat resort to any particular technique of
construction as a matter of craft, to assess the usefulness of such
techniques factually in particular cases, and even to innovate in
developing new techniques. The "attitude of mind" is the key.
"[Tihere is a world of difference between an attitude of mind that
honestly seeks to grasp these [indicia of legislative intent] . . . and
give them effect, and one that cavalierly throws them overboard
and leaves us at the mercy of the judge's 'day before yesterday.' "61
Judges who accept fidelity to legislative intent as a cast of mind
are free to treat the question of the substance of legislative intent
as a question of fact, and to act with the freedom that factual in56. In discussing Landis's treatment of legislative intent, I do not mean to suggest that
he ignores statutory language. Because Landis equates "intent" and "meaning," see id. at
888, discovery of legislative intent resolves questions of statutory language. Interestingly, in
contrast with Radin (especially Radin in his second essay), Landis finds little use for the
idea of purpose-for Landis, purpose is a placeholder for "spurious interpretation," id., for
the discretionary choices of "[sitrong judges," id. at 891.

57. Id. at 892; see id. at 893 ("honest effort of courts").
58. Id. at 892.
59. Id. at 892, 892-93.
60. Id. at 893.
61. Id. at 892.
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quiry presupposes.
B.
But is legislative intent really a fact? Radin, after all, dismisses it as fictional: as impossible. Landis can concede that legislative intent may not be precisely discoverable in any particular
case. His constitutional theory of the separation of powers, and his
ethical argument for judicial self-limitation, however, both assume
that legislative intent exists, even if it is not always apparent. But
what does it mean to say that legislative intent exists or does not
exist? Radin's claim is that the legislature as such is an entity incapable of intent because it is a collection or aggregate of individuals. Only individuals individually are capable of intent. Landis appears to agree. 62 He argues, however, that legislatures are neither
entities as such nor simply aggregates of individuals. It is this fact
that gives rise to the possibility of "legislative intent":
The records of legislative assemblies once opened and read with
a knowledge of legislative procedure often reveal the richest
kind of evidence. To insist that each individual legislator besides
his aye vote must also have expressed the meaning he attaches
to the bill as a condition precedent to predicating an intent on
the part of the legislature is to disregard the realities of legislative procedure. Through the committee report, the explanation
of the committee chairman, and otherwise, a mere expression of
assent becomes in reality a concurrence in the expressed views
of another. A particular determinate thus becomes the common
possession of the majority of the legislature, and as such a real
6
discoverable intent. "
Landis defends the idea of legislative intent by analyzing legislatures in much the same way that he analyzes courts. His first
step is to distinguish the individual actors, the legislators and
judges, from their roles. Next, he gives content to the roles.,Landis
addresses judges directly, and thus he describes the judge's role as
judges would experience it, as an attitude of mind. Landis, however, does not address legislators, but rather describes the legislative role to judges. His description is thus again framed in terms of
the judge's perception, this time of the visible manifestations of
legislative procedure. 64 Finally, in both instances, Landis holds the
62. Id. at 891-93.
63. Id. at 888-89.
64. This complex sense of perspective distinguishes Landis from Hurst. Landis treats
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actors to their roles. Because he argues directly to judges, Landis
portrays judicial conformity to role as a matter of ethics. Because
he describes the legislative role to judges, Landis treats legislative
conformity as an epistemological opportunity. To the extent that
judges treat legislators as acting within their role, judges can acquire knowledge of legislative intent.
The metaphysical assumption that underlies Landis's argument is this: judges are people, legislators are people. It is from
this premise that Landis derives his treatment of judicial role as a
form of consciousness, his rehabilitation of legislative intent, and
his emphasis on legislative procedure as a source of information as
to intent. Landis's governing assumption reveals the important difference, in emphasis if not necessarily in conclusion, between his
argument and that of Radin. Radin treats statutes as the initial
and fundamental subject of analysis, using as his organizing premise the proposition that statutes are words. His conclusions (implicit in his premise) are largely negative concerning the value of
statutory analysis per se. But it is these conclusions that constitute
the main burden of Radin's argument. He would not deny (how
could he?) that judges are people. Indeed, this second assumption
is central to his depiction of the jurisprudence of results. Personalizing, however, is for Radin the stopping point: what we are left
with, given the only limiting function of statutes as words. Landis
begins where Radin leaves off. For Landis, personalizing is a way of
describing legal institutions that opens up the possibility of the
positive jurisprudence that Radin could not derive from the idea of
statutes as words. In this jurisprudence, the characteristics of statutes as words, and indeed the characteristics of any of the modes
of evidence of legislative intent with which the judge's analysis
concerns itself, are largely irrelevant, a matter of detail. The judicial consciousness, the attitude of mind of fidelity to legislative intent, does not depend for its existence upon the character and
courts and legislatures as different kinds of institutions-even though he urges courts to
attempt "to recreate the atmosphere surrounding the statute in its passage and thus more
likely . . . give effect accurately to the real legislative purpose." Id. at 892. Thus, there is
always in Landis a sense of falling short, of the inevitably approximate quality of judicial
attempts at empathy. "[T]he emphasis must lie upon the honest effort of courts to give
effect to the legislature's aims, even though their perception be perforce through a glass
darkly." Id. at 893. Hurst, however, begins by describing legislatures as they would appear
to an observer free from the constraints of judicial process; an observer able to appreciate
fully the institutional capacities, limits, and agenda of legislators. J.W. HURST, supra note
53, at 1-29. Thereafter, in exploring the "judicial" subjects of statutory interpretation and
constitutional limits, Hurst brings to bear his model of legislative capacity; the peculiarities
of judicial vision are not a primary concern. See, e.g., id. at 52-53, 78-81.
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identity of the particular means through which judges simultaneously seek to learn and learn to seek legislative intent. So too with
the fact that individual legislators must organize their activities,
precisely because they are individuals, in ways that treat the views
of particular legislators as authoritative. The existence of legislative procedure, and not the precise identity of the particular kinds
of procedures in use, is the key.
C.
Landis differentiates individual officeholders from courts and
legislatures as institutions, and treats the individuals as primary
for purposes of analysis, in order to draw a distinction between
judges and the judicial role and to develop a conception of legislative intent that can give content to the judicial role. This connection betwben legislative intent and judicial role is vital. It is not
enough that legislative intent exists. Landis must show that in the
sense in which legislative intent exists, it is open at least in theory
to the view of individual judges, and thus would appear to the
judges to be a plausible organizing principle for a description of
the judicial role. To establish the visible existence of legislative intent, Landis relies upon a theory of legislative procedure. Individual legislators, in order to organize their activities, delegate responsibility for particular pieces of legislation to particular legislators;
these delegates explain and justify legislation to the other legislators; legislators treat these explanations and justifications as definitive for purposes of final deliberation. So long as legislative procedure generally takes this form, and so long as legislative
procedures are visible to judges, legislative intent, in Landis's system, is in principle accessible to judges.
A number of assumptions obviously underlie this elaborated
version of Landis's argument. Initially, Landis must assume either
that legislators explain and justify all features of legislation or that
the features of legislation that legislators do explain and justify are
those features that judges will find salient in applying statutes.
Moreover, Landis must also assume that the judicially visible explanations and justifications proffered by legislators are not, with
respect to the critical questions at least, self-conscious or strategic:
statements that in the interest of legislative compromise or some
other purpose are made principally for the benefit of watching
judges; statements that either preempt or disguise "true" explanations and justifications.
Landis would argue that the assumption underlying the theory
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of legislative procedure do not have to be always correct. Legislative intent does not need to be entirely visible to judges. So long as
judges ordinarily have something with which to work, so long as
there is some evidence of legislative intent that is salient and not
plainly a legislative fabrication, the attitude of mind of fidelity to
legislative intent will provide a plausible organizing principle for
judicial inquiry. There is a point, though, at which this argument,
even as it salvages Landis's theory of legislative intent, reduces his
larger theory of statutory interpretation to irrelevance. As evidence
of legislative intent becomes more fragmentary and less reliable,
the question of what judges do with that evidence, what inferences
they draw, how they organize their analysis, becomes more central,
and the fact that judges are committed to fidelity of legislative intent becomes more peripheral, both for judges themselves in the
process of judging, and for outside observers seeking to influence
or provide an account of the process of statutory interpretation.
Landis has no theory of what to do with evidence of legislative
intent."' He would treat the question as a matter of detail in order
to keep his theory consistent with the reality of an autonomous
judicial craft and to avoid the need either to acknowledge or reject
Radin's demonstration of the manipulability of the traditional
techniques of this craft. As fidelity to intent becomes more tentative, however, Landis ceases to be able to defend his claim to be
above the battle. He must throw in with Radin, and describe evidence of legislative intent, at the level of craft, as a constraint on
the jurisprudence of results similar in function to statutory words.
Or alternatively he must acknowledge the need for a theory that
would define the relationship among techniques of statutory interpretation, that would organize resort to all forms of evidence of
intent. This latter approach would be only conventionally a theory
of legislative intent. In substance it could not avoid becoming a
theory of the relationship of legislative process and statutory language. Statutory language would operate as both point of departure (how did it come to be?) and final arbiter (is this really a
plausible explanation?). But this dynamic plainly presupposes that
65. For Landis, the question is empirical. Legislative procedure is either revealing or it

is not. Landis is confident that attention to legislative proceedings will usually prove helpful
for the judge. "Legislative history similarly affords in many instances accurate and compel-

ling guides to legislative meaning." Landis, supra note 4, at 889. If, however, judges can find
nothing "accurate and compelling," Landis is prepared to concede Radin's point. "[H]ere
society and the legislature both entrust themselves to the law-making powers of courts." Id.
at 893. His empiricism, however, returns: this "group of cases" is "smaller than is generally
supposed." Id.
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statutory language, of itself, is somehow provocative. Thus, if the
Landis argument is not to lead us straight back to Radin, it leaves
us with (is simply another preparation for) the task of working out
a theory of statutory form.
III.

At important points in Radin's analysis, we repeatedly encounter images of substitution. For example, Radin represents
statutory words as frequently possessing only ritual significance.
Courts purport to interpret statutory language, but in doing so
they actually express conclusions reached on other grounds-the
jurisprudence of results. Radin regards words as nonetheless sometimes genuinely decisive. He imagines a limit to ambiguity, a
threshold beyond which (suddenly) words cannot take on the
meaning that the jurisprudence of results demands. For Radin, interpretation and statutory language are disjoint; each phenomenon
becomes relevant as a replacement for the other. In this sense, interpretation and statutory language are substitutes. Again: words
work only as limits because Radin conceives of words as functioning as categories and because he considers the process of categorization as imprecise. The working picture is once more one of substitution: the substitution of word X for phenomenon Y. And the
conclusion that Radin reaches is simply a conclusion about the
success or failure of substitution. Words are ambiguous up to a
point because substitution is incomplete.
Statutes in Radin's system present themselves as merely aggregates of words because substitution, as an analytic form, suggests that the appropriate response to ambiguity is the drawing of
distinctions, the further refinement and multiplication of categories, a repeated narrowing and replacement of focus. Within Radin's perspective, we work with particular statutory words rather
than a statute as a whole. If we were to treat statutes rather than
statutory words as relevant, we would be attempting to develop a
sense of pattern rather than aggregation. A sense of pattern, however, is difficult to accommodate within a logic of substitution. Patterning presupposes several ideas considered simultaneously; categorization presupposes ideas considered separately or in sequence.
It seems at first that Landis breaks free of the logic of substitution. He emphasizes relationships: between courts and legislatures, of judges to their office, among legislators. In each instance,
however, while initially describing a duality, Landis ultimately resolves the duality for purposes of analysis. Constitutional princi-
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pies require courts to prefer legislative judgments to their own.
Professional ethics requires judges to subordinate their own personalities to the requirements of role, and to fabricate legislative
judgments (if all else fails) as replacements for their own views.
Considerations of craft (effective fabrication) dictate that legislative procedure and not legislators becomes the subject of judicial
study. The inner logic is once more one of substitution. If we are
unpersuaded, it is for familiar reasons: the substitutions cannot be
complete, in much the same way that Radin's statutory words fail
to classify fully.
A true alternative to Radin must free itself further of the logic
of substitution. The notion of statutes as such, we might think,
should possess a particular informing significance: organize (allow
us to see) a relationship of text and meaning in which statute and
interpretation interrelate rather than substitute." Within this perspective, we would see the structure of the statutory text as itself
subject for (or to) the play of interpretation. The relevant consequences for the interpreter would be consequences for statutory
structure; the relevant values would be values concerning statutory
structure. This proposition, however, is not enough. It seems to
suggest nothing more than a formalism as empty as it is open. We
must also accept, therefore, a second idea. A truly substantive jurisprudence of results begins and ends with the interpretation of
statutory structure: orients itself initially and expresses itself ultimately through the process of coming to conclusion about what exactly the organization of a statute is.
Giving content to this last assertion requires a series of related
descriptive and normative commitments. Descriptive: we must be
able to specify how statutory structure can reveal or express matters of pertinence for a substantive jurisprudence of results. Normative: we must also be able to explain why, even if statutory
structure is thus relevant, a substantive jurisprudence could not
66. There is, of course, another alternative to the Radin (and thus the Landis) approach. This is the view of Professors Hart and Sacks, see H. Hart and A. Sacks, supra note
3, within which statutes react against, or are interpreted in the light of, a surrounding legal
universe-prototypically, the common law. I do not discuss the Hart and Sacks perspective
here (although I will in subsequent work) in part because, as adjusted by Professor Calabresi, see G. CALABREsi, supra note 3, it has become the recent subject of cogent analysis by
other writers. See, e.g., Weisburg, supra note 1. Moreover, in my own view, the underlying
notion of an enveloping legal environment-a dictionary-like background source of meanings-does not fit very well within the contemporary legal scene, notwithstanding its potential usefulness and the special care and sophistication with which Professors Hart and
Sacks, in particular, brought to bear in developing the idea. See Gudridge, supra note 40 at
686-98.
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properly proceed independently in any event. This latter question
is the easier to discuss first.
The obligation is in one sense constitutional. Statutes, in
whatever way that they turn out to be relevant, preempt (because
of their constitutional status) sources of law or forms of expressing
law that courts would otherwise treat as similarly relevant.67 There
67. The relative priority of statutes vis-A-vis common law or administrative regulations
is less certain than it first appears to be. In earlier periods in Anglo-American legal history,
the idea of statutory priority may not have been well-established. For example, medieval
English judicial treatment of statutes suggests to many historians that the relatively few
statutes of the period were seen as analogous to judgments in particular cases, and therefore
susceptible of rather casual handling by judges. See, e.g., S. THORNE, Introduction, A DisCOURSE UPON THE ExPosICION AND UNDERSTANDINGE OF STATUTES 5, 9 (S. Thorne ed. 1942).
But cf. Arnold, Statutes as Judgments: The Natural Law Theory of ParliamentaryActivity in Medieval England, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 329 (1977) (at least some medieval statutes
were less declaratory of general principles, and more transforming of such principles, and
thus were seen at the time as distinct from judgments as such). In a more recent past, critics
of late nineteenth and early twentieth century American judges sometimes charged that
courts of this period so enthusiastically deployed maxims calling for narrow construction of
statutes in derogation of the common law that the supposed priority of statutes over common law became more a matter of form than substance. See, e.g., Pound, Common Law and
Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 385-86 (1908) (noting an emerging contrary trend).
At present, the assumption of statutory supremacy runs up against at least three different sorts of contrary practice. Statutes striking courts as inconsistent with modern common
law have been artfully displaced through various means. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13
Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975). Professor Calabresi has not only called
attention to this phenomenon, but has defended at length an explicit, common law based
"second look" review of apparently obsolescent statutes. See G. CAL.ARESi, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). In addition, courts, especially the Supreme Court, have
arguably attributed greater or lesser rigor to constitutional provisions on the basis of an
implicit assessment of either legislative capacity as such or judicial competence relative to
legislative competence. Even if this is not the program to which courts in fact subscribe,
leading theorists contend that it should be. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)
(representational model of legislative process and its limits); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (greater emphasis on limits of relative judicial
competence). Constitutional law thus becomes a second legal regime regularly calling into
question, or marking as problematic, the priority of legislation. Interestingly, in those instances in which constitutional law actively develops, and largely preempts all but derivative
legislation, but see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the formative process may
more closely resemble common law accumulation than traditional models of statutory elaboration. Compare Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 230-36 (1968) (common law
element in constitutional adjudication) with Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15
U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 522-23 (1948) (adherence to initial interpretation of statute distinguishes statutory interpretation from common law approach). Finally, assertions of the priority of legislation must also confront the willingness of courts to defer to administrative
interpretations of statutes, a deference especially notable in some (but by no means all)
recent Supreme Court decisions. Compare Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S.
Ct. 3221, 3227, 3241-43, 3254 (1983) (giving weight to administrative construction), and Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (same) with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms v. Federal Lab. Rel. Auth., 104 S. Ct. 439 (1983) (rejecting agency inter-
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is also another way of perceiving the obligation. For a court, statutes are first of all significant insofar as litigants explain their presence and defend their claims by insisting that statutory language
authoritatively describes their situations: somehow summarizes not
merely their predicaments, but also the pertinent implications-what is to be done. A court may occasionally decide that
statutes are in fact beside the point. But unless the court is confident of this conclusion at the outset (the litigants must therefore
be deeply confused), the court confronts what it is likely to perceive as (what we might uncontroversially argue indeed is) an obligation, tracing from a responsibility to act in good faith that the
court owes to the litigants, to take proffered statutes seriously. A
court is obligated to work with statutes, in other words, in order to
discover what it is that the litigants think that a case involves, or
to express to the litigants what the court in the end thinks the case
concerns.6
pretation). There is also the more general phenomenon of legislative delegations of authority
to administrative agencies-delegations often so broad that statutory provisions themselves
arguably end up far in the background for purposes of administrative decisionmaking. See
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAsv. L. REV. 1667, 167677, 1694-98, 1711-12 (1975). It is not difficult to argue that the various regulations and decisions of administrators, like common law adjudication and the active elements in constitutional law, importantly circumscribe the range in which legislation as such truly governs.
References to legislative priority thus acquire something of a fictional cast.
All of these assertions are contestable. It certainly seems, however, that much at the
level of practice supports the argument that Radin, in his second essay, offered at the level
of political theory. Relative to other legal institutions, legislatures can make no special claim
to priority. See Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, supra note 9, at 405-06. Radin ultimately equivocated. "[W]ithin its constitutional powers, the legislature does in fact issue
directives to the court and . . . a court that refused to accept them would be openly violating its duties." Id. at 396. But it is possible to be more assertive. To assume a principle of
"institutional settlement," see H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 3, at 4-6, 1225, an allocation
to the legislature of the role of "chief policy-determining agency of the society," id. at 1140,
begs the essential question. As a matter of constitutional practice, "policy" is a product of
competition. At different times, and with respect to different matters, different lawmaking
institutions will take the lead. Questions of "institutional settlement" are chronically open,
and are as much subject to varying resolution as ostensibly distinct matters of substance. If
the traditional idea of statutory priority is to retain any content at all, it must be recast to
refer to the superior capacity of statutes (relative to common law, constitutional, or administrative materials) to capture the legal imagination. Statutes, we must believe, achieve preeminence only if they reveal something other legal materials cannot (or at least in the particular instance do not); something, once seen, which takes precedence, becomes the subject
for which other materials serve as simply commentary. The possibility of a legislative priority based on the power of statutory descriptions is implicitly one subject of much of the rest
of this essay. For the moment, it suffices to note that this reformulated view collapses the
distinction tentatively drawn in the text. The normative priority of statutes becomes a function of their descriptive capacity.
68. Should courts take statutes seriously because litigants do so if litigants invoke stat-
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Either version of the obligation to take statutes seriously is
open-ended. If there is little that a court can discern from statutory structure, "similarly relevant" is a weak constitutional duty:
preempts only minimally. And if statutes reveal or express little,
any obligation of the courts to adjudicate responsibly will include
only a limited duty to work with the statutes themselves. The normative relevance of statutes thus depends upon their descriptive
capacity. How much a court should work with statutes is a function of how much the court could work.
To what must we commit ourselves if we wish to see statutory
structure as substantively important? We might start with the proposition that a statute records -the politics of its own enactment. It
is tempting to describe a statute as an encoded utopia, a particular
vision of the world as it should be. And yet a statute is frequently
as much or more a register of resistance to that vision as well. Utopia and counter-utopia may co-exist. Insofar as a statute addresses
questions of enforcement, a statute reveals the fact of opposition
within the world in which the statute describes itself as applying.
More generally, statutory ambiguities, qualifications, and gaps are
often evidence of hesitation or unresolved dispute within the world
of the statute's adoption. A statute-its structure-is a model of
69

conflict.

utes only because they think that courts take statutes seriously? Perhaps, from the perspective of courts, it makes sense to reduce the range of vision, to ignore the reasons why litigants invoke statutes. Litigants may refer to statutes for a variety of reasons-not just
because they believe that courts have already displayed a preference for statutes, but in
order to try to persuade courts to develop such a preference, or (regardless of what litigants
think of judicial reactions) because statutes, in particular cases, are (it turns out) the only
legal materials that seem to express the litigants' point of view. In the latter two instances,
of course, the behavior of the litigants is plausible only if we are sure that statutes possess
content. If statutes are simply empty forms for expressing otherwise-reached judicial conclusions, the circularity of the judge's good faith obligation is indeed obvious. Litigants must,
in this instance, be referring to statutes only because (for some reason) judges prefer reference to the statutory form. The good faith argument, like the constitutional argument, see
supra note 67, thus links its normative claim with an assumption about descriptive capacity.
69. Writers addressing the subject of statutory interpretation frequently observe that
the process of enacting legislation leaves its mark on the final product:
Adjustments, bargains, compromises made in hammering out the final product
will likely have explicit or implicit reflections in the different elements built into
the statute. We should not romanticize the process of obtaining legislation; it is
usually a somewhat rough-and-tumble business, and what emerges is unlikely to
be a finely joined piece of cabinet work.
J.W. HURST, supra note 53, at 59-60; see, e.g., Levi, supra note 67, at 521-22; Radin, A Short
Way With Statutes, supra note 9, at 399. Hurst's carpentry metaphor nicely captures the
usual view: the politics of enactment leaves legislation flawed-ambiguous, subject to exception, incomplete in the realization of its purpose; as though it departed from some ideal.
The proposition that a statute is a model of conflict is in part a variation on this theme. I

19831

LEGAL IMAGINATION

In coming to a conclusion about structure, the interpreter attaches a specific meaning to ambiguous statutory language, attrib"utes or denies emphasis to particular parts of a statute, proceeds
on the basis of some idea of statutory priorities: in short, brings
the statute into focus. If statutory structure is a model of conflict,
we should not be surprised to discover that such focusing is in fact
the work of the interpreter. But we can also see that, even if we
regard the interpreter rather than the statute as decisive, we need
not therefore treat interpretation and statutory structure as independent. The interpreter working with the statute encounters a set
of cues that identify the relevant substantive prejudices to bring to
bear. Indeed, we can imagine a more positive role for statutory
structure, without repudiating our initial image of interpretation as
resolution. The interpreter may discover that statutory form is not
entirely plastic; that substantive conflict is not expressed only in
the form of thoroughgoing structural ambivalence; that indeed
structure, if only rarely truly settling, may nonetheless build into
the statute a kind of political momentum. Often, to be sure, a bill
also mean, however, to rework substantially the standard assumption. Instead of viewing the
political process as in some way "marring" legislation-depriving it of its ideal form-I will
treat what might appear to be "defacing" as precisely the point of legislation. Conflict does
not blunt legislative expression; rather, it is precisely what legislation is supposed to express.
For this approach to move beyond the stage of slogan, it must suggest a view of both
the substance of politics-for example, as to whether important questions are in principle
susceptible of resolution-and the relationships among the institutions of politics-for example, as to whether we can identify any one institution as more responsible than others for
political choices. Traditional views of statutes assume that substantive questions of politics
are resolvable in principle (and are frequently resolved in practice) and that the institution
with chief responsibility for resolution is the legislature. (This is, of course, a caricature of
the efforts of thoughtful writers on the theory of statutory interpretation; but it at least
describes a usual point of departure or reflex attitude.) The idea of a statute as a model of
conflict, I think, carries with it a different (although hardly unfamiliar) picture. Substantive
questions of politics often involve hard choices implicating fundamental conflicts susceptible
in principle of no settled resolution. The various institutions of politics, informal as well as
formal, set up a progression (always itself subject to challenge, variation, and rearrangement), at each stage of which the fundamental conflicts reappear, to be acted upon, but
never (or hardly ever) finally. Each institution, however, defines the terms in which the next
faces the issue, in this way perhaps screening out "false conflicts," but also thereby imparting a bias, which may be more or less convincing, to the manner in which the question
will next be faced. Cf. Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION
249, 262-66 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1983) (similar but more deterministic analogy of legal reasoning to the process of writing a chain novel). Legislatures often figure rather early in the
process; administrators and courts frequently enter later; none can claim a privileged status.
This is also, obviously, a caricature. For the present I do not mean to defend or elaborate
the picture directly. Instead, I intend only to test the plausibility of its formal corollary-that if we regard statutes as models of conflict, we can begin to understand how statutes in particular cases figure more than ostensibly in the thinking of result-oriented judges.
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is defeated even as it is enacted: qualifications overwhelm-or at
least nothing stands in the way of the interpreter who, in attaching
priorities in reading a statute, would emphasize the qualifications.
But sometimes the utopian element survives. A particular substantive vision that an interpreter cannot easily reject-that if rejected
re-presents itself as a series of seemingly technical problems: the
legislative struggle that a statute embodies may not merely reintroduce itself-simultaneously substantively and structurally-as the
subject of interpretation, but give direction to interpretation as
well. It is this possibility that a substantive approach to statutory
structure would ultimately emphasize.
IV.
The United States Supreme Court announced its decision in
three cases on March 8, 1982: Bread Political Action Committee
(PAC) v. Federal Election Commission (FEC);70 United Mine
1
Workers of America Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson;
and Marine Bank v. Weaver.7 The issue in each case was one of
statutory construction. In all three cases the Court was unanimous
in both its decision and opinion. We would not regard the result in
any of these cases as surprising.
Nonetheless, we can see in each of these "safe" opinions a significant fragility or contingency in its approach to statutory construction. The artifice is too obvious; we are too much aware of
effort. The manifestations of effort, the signs that what is constructed is after all delicate work, show up when we read the opinions as confrontations with problems of statutory structure. At the
same time, the structural problems turn out to be expressions of
central substantive controversies: politics encoded. This is, of
course, what the preceding abstract discussion prepared us to see.
But these cases are not simply "illustrations." Much of what is interesting in the idea of statutory structure is left unexpressed at
the general level, but becomes plainly apparent once we begin to
try to recover the context of a particular case. The relation of abstract to particular (here anyway) is not one of rule and application-simply that of start and finish.
70. 455 U.S. 577 (1982).

71. 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
72. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
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A.
In Bread PoliticalAction Committee v. FEC73 the question at
issue was whether section 437h(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act (Campaign Act)" authorized political action committees
to take advantage of certain expedited procedures in challenging
the constitutionality of money raising limitations that the Act imposed."5 By its terms, section 437h(a) recognized the Federal Election Commission, "the national committee of any political party, or
any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President" as entitled to institute actions subject to accelerated disposition.7 6 A political action committee as such obviously cannot fit
itself within the statutory list. Justice O'Connor, writing for the
unanimous Supreme Court, understood this fact to be both beginning and end of the matter.
Our analysis of this issue of statutory construction "must
.77
begin with the language of the statute itself' .
*

. .

§ 437h(a) affords its unique system of expedited review

to three carefully chosen classes of persons ....78
*

.

.[O]nly parties meeting the express requirements of §

437h(a) may invoke its procedures. Because the appellants do
not meet these requirements, they may not invoke the expedited
procedures of § 437h(a)7
Political action committees could raise their constitutional grievances only through ordinary channels.
Justice O'Connor represented plaintiffs as struggling against
73. 455 U.S. 577 (1982).
74. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 315, 88

Stat. 1263, 1285 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1982)).
75. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(4)(D) (1982).
76. The Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President may institute
such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States, including
actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of this Act. The district court immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the United States Court of
Appeals, for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.
2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1982).
77. 455 U.S. at 580 (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187
(1980).
78. Id. at 581.
79. Id. at 584.
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"the obvious meaning of the language of § 437h(a)," 0 and as unable, in the face of "the plain language of § 437h(a),"' 1 to provide
"'clear evidence' of a 'clearly expressed legislative intention' that
the unique expedited procedures of § 437h be afforded to parties
other than those belonging to the three listed categories."' 2 The
case, as she portrays it, is an easy one. And yet, despite its
straightforward air, Justice O'Connor's analysis includes several
steps that, once we recognize them, are by no means self-evident.
The statute is not as decisive as it first seems.
For Justice O'Connor, it apparently goes without saying that
political action committees are themselves the relevant unit: distinct entities, and as such legally opaque rather than merely transparent aggregates of individuals who might very well (as individuals) satisfy the requirements of section 437h(a). An assumption of
this sort is a surprising one to make automatically. The question of
whether to ascribe entity status to particular associations has often
proven difficult."' No obvious short-cuts are apparent in the facts
in Bread PAC. There is no indication, for example, that the tradeassociations that organized the political action committees incorporated the groups. Indeed, the committees were merely "separate
segregated funds.

8

4

The Court of Appeals regarded them as "sim-

ply political arms of the parent organizations." 8 The trade associations themselves, of course, were free to incorporate. 8' The corpo80. Id. at 581.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The "reality" of organizations-whether they or their members individually are the
legally relevant actors-has often seemed to courts to be not only an open question, but one
susceptible of different answers at different stages in a legal proceeding. Thus, in the famous
case of United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), the Supreme Court
held that a labor union's national organization, although unincorporated, was capable of
being sued as a distinct entity, contrary common law notwithstanding. Id. at 383-92. Capacity, however, was not the equivalent of liability; the entity question reappeared once the
Court reached the merits. Chief Justice Taft held that plaintiffs did not identify actions of
the national organization's officers as clearly enough "official" in character to implicate the
organization under agency principles in a strike called by some of its members; for purposes
of liability, therefore, the national union ceased to be the relevant actor. Id. at 393-96. For a
contemporary discussion of the relationship of Coronado Coal's initial capacity holding and
then-existing case law, see Sturges, UnincorporatedAssociations as Parties to Actions, 33
YALE L.J. 383 (1924). See generally, Developments in the Law-JudicialControl of Actions
of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REv. 983, 1080-87 (1963) (summarizing course of capacity law after Coronado Coal).
84. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441(b)(2)(C), (b)(4) (1982).
85. Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 635 F.2d 621, 624 n.3
(7th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 577 (1982).
86. Arguably, the Federal Election Campaign Act (Campaign Act) encourages incorpo-
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rate status of a trade association, however, should not transmit
itself to a group it sets up, any more than a corporation alters the
status of a partnership by participating in its formation. 7 In any
event, even if we regard the political action committee as so plainly
not a separate entity as to merge its identity with the organizing
parent, it is by no means clear that the "derivative" corporate status of political action committees (or indeed the corporate status
of the trade associations themselves) under state law should be
conclusive of their characterization under federal law as well. Although federal "veil piercing" law is less than clear, the tendency
seems to be to adhere to state characterizations only if consistent
with the substantive policies of the federal statutes at issue."8 The
question of entity status, we might think, is properly open in advance of statutory analysis rather than, as the Supreme Court
treated it, already resolved at the outset.
In its starting assumption, moreover, the Bread PAC opinion
departs from the agnostic approach the Supreme Court has often
adopted in dealing with questions of standing and entity status. If
an association, regarded as an entity, cannot assert an appropriate
interest, the Court usually considers whether the nature of the litigation will permit the group to be treated as an aggregate, in order
to make possible analysis of the interests of individual members as
well.8 9 At first glance, the political action committees seem to gain
ration of trade associations. As the court of appeals noted in Bread PAC, 635 F.2d at 627,
incorporated trade associations may claim certain, albeit limited, solicitation rights other
than those permitted by section 441b(b)(4)(D), the substantive provision at issue in Bread
PAC. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(4)(A)(i), (b)(4)(B) (1982).
87. The Uniform Partnership Act is explicit in permitting corporations to enter into
partnerships. See UNIV. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 2, 6 (1983). Any questions (now long since put
to rest) about this form of corporate activity arose as matters of corporate rather than partnership law. See W. CARY & M. EISENSERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 42, 43
(5th ed. 1980) (whether participation in a partnership was ultra vires).
88. See Note, Piercingthe CorporateLaw Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrineunder Federal
Common Law, 95 HARv. L. Rzv. 853 (1982).

89. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980)
(religious beliefs of members too personal and varied to permit assertion by association);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 512-14 (1975) (association permitted to assert interests
of members but member interests found to be inappropriate for standing purposes); id. at
514-17 (damage claims of members cannot be asserted by association; injunctive claims
proper but individual interests too conjectural to confer standing). The occasional willingness of the Supreme Court to disregard the formally separate status of an entity and its
"members" is best illustrated by Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333 (1977), in which the Court held that a state agency organized to encourage the
national marketing of locally-grown apples was equivalent to a trade association of apple
growers, and might therefore assert the interests of those growers as a basis for litigative
standing. Id. at 341-45. But see id. at 345 (agency also possesses interest of its own). These

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:493

little from aggregate treatment. Section 441b(b)(4)(D) of the Campaign Act does not distinguish between a trade association and its
political action committee, and identifies the "members" of the
trade association as corporations.' Since corporations cannot vote
in presidential elections, focusing attention on these "members"
would not confer standing. The statute's usage, however, is not
clearly exclusive. There may be "members" of a political action
committee other than corporations who can indeed satisfy section
437h(a)-for example, a committee's actual operating personnel.
Notably, the Campaign Act specifically requires designation of a
treasurer.' 1 Furthermore, section 441b(b)(4)(D) identifies corporations as "members" but it also treats the corporations themselves
in a "veil piercing" fashion. It limits political action committee
fundraising to shareholders, officers, executive personnel, and their
families: 92 statutory precedent, perhaps, for treating corporations
as aggregates for standing purposes under section 437h(a) and for
regarding political action committee personnel as also relevant to
standing analysis.' 8
Justice O'Connor did not necessarily err in attributing entity
status to political action committees under the Federal Election
Campaign Act. We might in the end conclude that her characterization is appropriate. In treating the issue as resolved from the
start, though, Justice O'Connor makes a structural as well as a
cases suggest that the Supreme Court views the question of the separateness of an association and its members as presumptively beside the point: as relevant only if considerations of

proper litigative procedure so suggest in a particular case. Insofar as it is concerned chiefly
with whether the interests of individuals are appropriate for "representation" by an association, the Court seems to regard associations as simply another form of litigative class. Cf.
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1504-16 (1976) (use of
predomination requirement for class certification as means of identifying interests appropriate or inappropriate for class representation).
90. Section 441b(b)(4)(D) states:

This paragraph shall not prevent a trade association or a separate segregated
fund established by a trade association from soliciting contributions from the
stockholders and executive or administrative personnel of the member corpora-

tions of such trade association and the families of such stockholders or personnel
to the extent that such solicitation. . . has been separately and specifically approved by the member corporation involved, and such member corporation does
not approve any such solicitation by more than one such trade association in any
calendar year.

2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(D) (1982).
91. Id. § 433(b)(4) (1982).
92. Id. § 441b(b)(4)(D) (1982).
93. Cf. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 103 S. Ct. 552, 557
(1982) ("some relatively enduring and independently significant financial or organizational
attachment is required to be a 'member' under § 441b(b)(4)(C)").
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substantive commitment. She asserts that statutory language is
clear in its implications: on its face a definitive resolution. It is this
attribution of clarity that we can see is open to question.
The idea of statutory clarity is indeed a recurring theme in the
Bread PAC opinion. Justice O'Connor repeatedly refers to section
437h(a) as creating "three specifically enumerated classes,"" and
as therefore the product of sensitive drafting: "three carefully chosen classes."'95 "Congress.

.

. went to the trouble of specifying that

only two precisely defined types of artificial entity and one class of
natural persons could bring these actions."'96 The Court's opinion,
however, also reveals evidence that description of section 437h(a)
in these terms is notably artificial. Nothing in the record of congressional deliberations suggests close congressional attention to
wording. "In fact, the section's legislative history is too brief and
ambiguous to provide much solace to either side of the present
controversy.'

7

The language of section 437h(a), for that matter, is

not even original.
The grant of standing to the three listed categories of plaintiffs
is similar to the grant Congress had adopted earlier in 26 U.S.C.
§ 9011(b) authorizing the "Commission, the natural committee
of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President" to bring suits to implement or construe the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act .... 98
The fact of borrowing seemingly subverts the image of careful
drafting. It also shifts the focus of inquiry from section 437h(a) to
its parent, section 9011(b). Section 9011(b) apparently attempts to
facilitate quick resolution of questions of interpretation in order
not to bog down the electoral process. This objective explains the
provision's affirmative thrust-its waiver of usual exhaustion rules,
its use of three-judge district courts, and its requirement that a
case "be in every way expedited.""" But this purpose also may suggest that the provision's "limitation" is a kind of optical illusion;
an accident of language, 100 difficult to see as contributing to the
94. 455 U.S. at 580.

95. Id. at 581.

96. Id. at 583.
97. Id. at 581.
98. Id. at 579 n.2 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1) (1976)).
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2) (1976).
100. On this view, the reference in section 9011(b)(1) to "[tihe Commission, the national committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President" becomes an expansive reference similar to the immediately preceding administrative review
section, 26 U.S.C. § 9011(a) (1976). That section confers standing on "any interested per-
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provision's aim.10 1 The statutory emphasis falls more on the nature
of the question than on the precise identity of the parties. We become aware, once again, of the "imposed" nature of the rigor Justice O'Connor discovers in the analogous standing provision of section 437h(a).102
The Bread PAC opinion does not so much respond to the form
of section 437h(a) as supply that form in the first place. An alternative reading was possible. If we emphasize the casualness of the
statutory language, "individual eligible to vote" might plausibly refer to persons participating in the operation of political action
committees: for example, treasurers. To note this second approach
to section 437h(a), however, is not necessarily to criticize the Supreme Court for imposing the form that it chose. Neither statutory
form-rigor or relaxation-can claim an a priori superiority.
Whether Justice O'Connor's opinion is persuasive or not depends
upon our sense of the implications of her choice of form. Initially,
the question is one concerning the terms of the particular statute
at issue: What drops out of or enters the analysis because of Justice O'Connor's choice? We may also face a question pertaining to
a larger jurisprudence: What concerns might prompt Justice
O'Connor to sacrifice an equally appropriate approach to the statute in question?
It is easy to see that Justice O'Connor's representation of section 437h(a) as "clear" blocks (in her discussion) a ready recognition of the provision's significance within the Campaign Act as a
whole. Because she regards the statutory provision as straightforward, Justice O'Connor approaches its legislative history warily. If
the deliberative record is to be relevant, it must reveal a congressional intention precisely and plainly different from what Justice
son." Id. Of course, the language in the two sections is different. But a priori, it is by no
means clear which provision is more restricted. Section 9011(b)(1) has its specific categories-Justice O'Connor's point. Nonetheless the provision seems to prejudge, through these
categories, the question of "interest." But cf. Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 689 F.2d 1006, 1011 (1982), petition for reh'g en banc granted, 689 F.2d 1016
(11th Cir. 1983) (section 437h(a) categories do not eliminate additional judicial standing
inquiry), discussed infra note 131. Depending on the content of judge-made standing law
(seemingly acknowledged rather than replaced by section 9011(a)), "any interested person"
under section 9011(a) might, in particular cases, fail to encompass the full range of section
9011(b)(1) litigants. Instead of treating either provision's language as precise, it may be

more plausible to give first emphasis to the legislative commitment to haste that is evident
in both provisions.
101. But see infra text accompanying note 110.

102. Appellants in Bread PAC argued along these lines. 455 U.S. at 583.
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O'Connor reads in the statutory language.10 3 Not surprisingly, Justice O'Connor fails to find the requisite clear statement and she
thus dismisses the legislative debate.10 4 This approach to the analysis of legislative history is in two ways distracting. It makes a demand that is unlikely to be met. Congressional debate rarely expresses itself in the precise language for which Justice O'Connor
searches. But more importantly, Justice O'Connor's emphasis on
what is absent also leads her to overlook what is in fact there.
The legislative history reported in Bread PAC, although limited, reveals that section 437h(a) was chiefly the work of Senator
Buckley, 05 who we know was a leading opponent of the Campaign
Act. 10 The history. that the Court recites also suggests that both
proponents and opponents of the legislation were doubtful of the
Campaign Act's constitutionality in all respects.10 7 Even if we
think that neither side in fact cared about the first amendment,
legislative history suggests at least that some proponents of the
legislation believed that, unless constitutional doubts were accommodated within the statutory structure, the opportunity for legal
argument (on this view a kind of filibuster) would confuse the legislative process. Section 437h(a) is thus precisely a structural embodiment within the Campaign Act of legislative conflict. 08 As
such, and because of its particular content, section 437h(a) has important implications as an indicator of the way that the statute
''expects" to be read.
Section 437h(a) incorporates within the Campaign Act an apparent congressional acknowledgment that, notwithstanding their
seeming definitiveness, the substantive provisions of the Act are
more truly tentative. The exact reach of the Act depends not so
much on the terms of the statute itself as on the content of an
extrinsic constitutional law. Legislative acquiescence in this way in
the final role of constitutional law (and thus the role of the courts)
in statutory drafting is noteworthy not simply because it represents a retreat from the usual idea of assertive or definitive legislation. It also permits a court that is engaged in constitutional review-the process of final legislative specification-to ignore
underlying questions about the primacy of judicial formulations:
103. Id. at 581.
104. Id. at 584.
105. Id. at 581-82, 582 n.3 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 10,562 (1974)).

106. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
107. See 455 U.S. at 582 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 10,562 (1974); id. at 35,140).
108. 120 CONG. REc. 10,562 (1974).
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questions, that is, about the definitiveness of constitutional law itself. The Campaign Act raises no Katzenbach v. Morgan0 9
problems. Here, at least, self-confident judicial analysis of constitutional values, whether in the process of review as such, or as part
of an ostensible exercise in statutory construction, is peculiarly appropriate. The statute itself sanctions such activism.
Against the background of section 437h(a)'s larger significance,
it is surely ironic that Justice O'Connor treats this particular statutory provision as on its own terms so self-contained. Given the
overall significance of constitutional adjudication within the statutory scheme, and the corollary retreat from statutory claims to
finality, the appropriate approach in interpreting the standing requirements of section 437h(a) would seem to be one that encouraged such constitutional litigation and (if necessary) expressed
little hesitancy in treating the relevant statutory language as casual rather than precise.
And yet this same background may also justify Justice
O'Connor's more constricting approach. The Campaign Act,. after
all, did become law. The opponents of the bill failed within the
legislative process. Even if proponents were prepared to recognize
the tentativeness of statutory provisions in the face of the Constitution, they did not therefore mean for the statute to be utterly
nugatory. Constitutional adjudication would complete the task of
legislation rather than nullify it. To this end, section 437h(a) in its
109. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The Supreme Court has indicated, although not without ambiguity or dissent, that congressional interpretations of the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments may command judicial deference, at least if the congressional readings extend
constitutional protection of individual rights beyond the limits courts would otherwise fix.
See generally Choper, CongressionalPower to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1982) (summarizing developments after Katzenbach). Presumably, this judicial deference, whatever its precise form,
would also cover congressional interpretations of the Bill of Rights, in their literal capacity
as limits on the federal government. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 371-72
(1970) (White, J., dissenting).
In the context of federal campaign finance legislation, the question of judicial deference
to congressional constitutional interpretation might arise in connection with construction of
provisions regulating campaign contributors. A narrow reading could further a supposed legislative respect for first amendment rights of contributors greater than the Supreme Court
would itself extend, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-30 (1976) (per curiam). A
broader view of the provisions would fit a possible congressional concern for the indirect
censoring effects of private financing, a concern the Supreme Court has found difficult to
link with the first amendment. See id. at 48-49; Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?,82 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 63142 (1982). The question would become: which of these deviant constitutional theories (if
either) had Congress espoused? Cf. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-17
(1981) (requiring explicit congressional adoption of fourteenth amendment theory).
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entirety serves to expedite litigation (to bring the process of legislation to a close). 110 Constitutional adjudication takes time; section
437h(a) operates to reduce that time to a minimum. But delay is a
function not only of the length of particular suits but of the total
number of suits. To permit political action committees- organizations under the Act of precisely the kinds of people who would
have an interest in routinely opposing the Act's implementation-to take advantage of section 437h(a) would be to invite a
flood of section 437h(a) suits, if only for the purpose of delay, and
perhaps without regard for the constitutional merits of the claims.
It might be better, therefore, to restrict suit under section 437h(a)
to groups that have a more disinterested (or at least more complex) perspective and thus are less likely to raise constitutional
claims unless constitutional concerns are truly salient: thus the
statutory limits on standing.
There is, however, a fundamental difficulty for this way of rationalizing Justice O'Connor's opinion. It would appear that the
only obstacle that Bread PAC creates for political action committees in seeking access to section 437h(a) is one of pleading. In the
future, committee suits must be brought in the name of individual
members or functionaries who are eligible voters-a committee
treasurer or other officer.1" This is hardly a serious impediment
and therefore it would seem that section 437h(a) cannot accomplish the limitation of constitutional litigation that- we have hypothesized as a possible defense for Justice O'Connor's restrictive
reading of the standing language. Indeed, if political action committees can so easily outmaneuver Bread PAC, it is hard to come
up with any explanation for the decision that attributes a particular purpose to the standing limits as such. Justice O'Connor at one
point invokes a clear statement requirement limiting judicial leeway in construing statutes that alter ordinary jurisdictional arrangements.1 1 2 But even if concern for which cases come first is
110. Section 437h(a) permits litigants to skip usual proceedings at the district court

level and move immediately to the court of appeals. See supra note 76. The policy of expedition is also apparent in the remaining subsections of section 437h, which limit the time for
an appeal to the Supreme Court to twenty days, see 2 U.S.C. § 437h(b) (1982), and require
both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court to accelerate their usual procedures. See
id. § 437h(c).
111. Cf. Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 689 F.2d 1006, 1009, 1011

(1982), petition for reh'g en banc granted, 689 F.2d 1016 (11th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff corporate president has standing under section 437h(a) in challenge to Campaign Act restriction
on corporate political contributions).

112. 455 U.S. at 580-81.
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proper,' " Bread PAC's approach to section 437h(a) does absolutely nothing to restore the old order if all that it requires is a
change in nominal parties. Nor can we assume that the Supreme
Court obtained anything but a meaninglessly brief reprieve from
the substantive constitutional issues that the Bread PAC litigation
raised-assuming both that it is appropriate for the Court to seek
to avoid such questions "4 and that the particular issues here were
ones that the Court indeed preferred not to face. " 5
We are perhaps left with a purely expressive account. Bread
PAC is simply one more illustration of the Supreme Court's recent
(albeit fluctuating) commitment to the idea that allegations of
standing should be precisely put. " 6 The Court does not treat the
language of section 437h(a) as clearly defined-as the beginning
and end of statutory analysis-because of some theory of the statute and its interpretation. Instead, the Court is predisposed to
treat standing requirements in general as clear in order to justify
its policy of penalizing ambiguous (or wrong) allegations. Any de113. But cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263-64 (1975)
("But it would be difficult, indeed, for the courts, without legislative guidance, to consider
some statutes important and otfiers unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connection with the former").
114. Compare Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (exploring circumstances in which avoidance is proper),
with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (emphasizing limits on use of
avoidance techniques).
115. The Supreme Court decided cases raising first amendment challenges to the Campaign Act prior to Bread PAC. See, e.g., California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). And it has
also decided such cases since Bread PAC. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to
Work Comm., 103 S. Ct. 552 (1982).
116. In a series of important cases, the Supreme Court has insisted that judicial acknowledgment of plaintiff's standing, or of a claim's justiciability more generally, requires
allegations in a complaint clearly spelling out the relationship between challenged acts of
defendant and injury to plaintiff's interests. This specification, the Court has sometimes
suggested, must be precise enough to reveal how the remedy a plaintiff requests will indeed
cure the alleged injury. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1667 (1983);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-44 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 503-04, 508, 516-17 (1975). A second line of the Court's decisions, however, reveals
a greater willingness to draw inferences from limited pleadings, either leaving specific questions of causal relationships for trial, see, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
366, 376-78 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109-15 (1979), or
treating the causal relationship as sufficiently self-evident to require no further investigation, see, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 242-43 (1982); Watt v. Energy Action Educ.
Found., 454 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1981). In still other cases, plaintiffs supplemented allegations
in complaints with sufficient evidence adduced in discovery and accepted in trial court findings to establish the requisite relationships. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74-77 (1978).

1983]

LEGAL IMAGINATION

fense of this approach, we can see, would shift the frame of reference dramatically. The Campaign Act itself would not be relevant;
instead, we would find ourselves discussing whatever controversies
underlie theories of pleading.
This is indeed a radical reading of the Bread PAC opinion. It
suggests that the explicit subject of Justice O'Connor's analysis-section 437h(a) and its construction-is not in fact the true
subject but simply the context or medium within which other independent concerns express their presence. It also emphasizes, in
identifying the relevant autonomous policies, a theme in recent Supreme Court adjudication that so far has become only barely expressed and, to the extent that the Court is actually committed to
the idea of strict pleading, brings the Supreme Court into conflict
with prevailing theories of pleading and procedure. 7 Before we
accept this picture of extreme statutory passivity, therefore, we
might reconsider the assumption that brought us to this point: the
idea that a political action committee can easily reacquire standing
by bringing suit in the name of a voter member.
At least at first glance, it looks like the matter is straightforwardly resolved in CaliforniaMedical Association v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)Q8 a Supreme Court decision of a year earlier. There, the Court avoided the question of PAC standing under
section 437h(a) by emphasizing the individual plaintiffs in the
case. "The individual appellants . . . fall within this last [section
437h(a)] category [voters], and, as members and officers of CMA
and CALPAC, have a sufficiently concrete stake in this controversy
to establish standing to raise the constitutional claims at issue
here."11 9 But why does the Court find it necessary to make two
points? It is not enough that individual plaintiffs are voters who
fall immediately into a section 437h(a) category. They are also
members and officers of the PAC and its parent association, and
this fact, apparently, is equally important for the Supreme Court
117. See Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65

CORNELL

L.

REv.

398 (1980). Opinion-writing Justices frequently call attention to the relationship between
their approaches to standing and background theories of pleading. Compare City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1675 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I am aware of no

case decided since the abolition of the old common law forms of action.

. .

that in any way

supports this crabbed construction of the complaint"), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
528 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("reverting to the form of fact pleading long abjured in
the federal courts"), with Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 384 (1982) (Powell,
J., concurring) ("Liberal pleading rules have both their merit and their price").

118. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
119. Id. at 187 n.6.
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in explaining its finding of standing.
This redundancy has its origins in Buckley v. Valeo. 20 Buckley did not involve a suit brought by either a PAC or its members,
but rather an initial challenge to the constitutionality of the Campaign Act prosecuted by Senator Buckley, other members of Congress, various candidates, political parties and public interest
groups. In passing on a challenge to the standing of these various
litigants, the Supreme Court began by observing that, although
"Congress, in enacting [section 437h(a)] . . . , intended to provide
judicial review to the extent permitted by Art. III, ''121 Congress
"may not, of course, require this Court to render opinions in matters which are not 'cases or controversies.' 122 After raising the
possibility of constitutional restraints on the reach of section
437h(a), however, the Buckley Court did not proceed to assess the
standing of any particular plaintiffs. "In our view, the complaint in
this case demonstrates that at least some of the appellants have a
sufficient 'personal stake' ...
"2
CaliforniaMedical Association, we can now see, was a case in
which the Supreme Court carried out the approach that Buckley
set forth (even if it did not fully follow). The majority in California Medical Association refers to the PAC membership of individual voters to confirm that Congress has not exceeded "the constraints of art. III of the Constitution . . .. ""' This conclusion,
however, creates two problems. First, it at least seems that California Medical Association and Bread PAC are inconsistent. In the
earlier case, for apparently constitutional reasons, the Supreme
Court emphasized the organizational membership of voters in order to justify their standing. But in the second decision, as a matter of statutory analysis under section 437h(a), the Court holds
that the organizational matrix is beside the point. After Bread
PAC, presumably, it would be improper, if we take the statute seriously, to place much emphasis on PAC membership as such. This
conclusion is especially persuasive if we explain the limitation in
the language of section 437h(a) by reference to a congressional concern that PACs not use section 437h(a) to delay implementation of
the statute. 2 But given California Medical Association, absent
120. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).

121. Id. at 11-12.
122. Id. at 11.

123. Id. at 12.
124. 453 U.S. at 187 n.6.
125. See supra text following note 109.
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emphasis on PAC membership, voter standing-that which section
437h(a) explicitly authorizes-is apparently constitutionally suspect. Do Bread PAC and California Medical Association, if we
read them together, suggest that, given the language of section
437h(a), voters cannot now refer to PAC membership, and therefore, notwithstanding the language of section 437h(a), they lack
standing to sue for constitutional reasons?
Perhaps we should look more closely at the ostensibly constitutional requirement that California Medical Association is enforcing. Herein lies the second problem. CaliforniaMedical Association is either assuming that voters have at stake only interests
that are too general to provide a basis for standing, 2 or that the
first amendment rights that the voters are claiming do not operate
to protect voters qua voters and therefore voter interests, even if
real, are beside the point-irrelevant in light of the substance of
the litigation. 27 Neither formulation, however, describes a standing rule that in cases other than California Medical Association
the Supreme Court has been prepared to label as unequivocally
constitutional in origin. Bars against assertions of generalized injury or against invocations of purposively irrelevant constitutional
provisions are supposedly "prudential"-open to Congress to set
aside. 28 If, as the Court tells us, "[t]he grant of standing under §
126. Cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27 (1974)
(interest as citizen too "generalized").
127. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 405-07 (1981) (plaintiff who does not claim to
be a "mature minor" cannot assert abortion statute infringes constitutional rights of members of this class); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970) (the question is "whether the interest sought to be protected. . . is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question"). The inquiry into the salience of a given interest is often personalized-restated as an investigation of whether a litigant is invoking a "third party's" rights.
See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (ordinarily "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that. . . it
might also be taken as applying to other persons or in other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional"). For a discussion of the relationship of "zone of interests"
analysis and notions of "third-party" rights, see L. TRiE, AMMCAN CONSTTTONAL LAW
§§ 3-22, 3-23, 3-28 (1978).
128. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975); Garvey, A Litigation Primer for Standing Dismissals, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 545, 562-63 (1980). Like Congress, federal
courts may also recognize exceptions to "prudential" standing rules. The Supreme Court has
done so at least once in the case of the ban on assertions of generalized interests. See Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer standing to assert rights under the first amendment
Establishment Clause). The Court has frequently waived the rule against asserting thirdparty rights. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-16 (1976) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1960); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional
Jus Tertii, 88 HAnv. L. Rsv. 423 (1974).
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437h" is "limited only by the constraints of Art. III,''2 e why is
there any problem in California Medical Association? Congress
has simply brushed aside some judge-made rules.
But then again, the distinction between "constitutional" and
"prudential" standing rules is not an easy one.13 0 The Supreme
Court has not committed itself unhesitatingly to a precise demarcation. 18 ' Perhaps as a result, the Court has been at times uncomfortable in acknowledging a power on the part of Congress to take
over standing questions for itself.' Arguably, the Supreme Court
may yet concede that practically any congressional judgment about
relevant injuries is likely to withstand the Court's scrutiny.' It is
129. 453 U.S. at 187 n.6.
130. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1644-47 (10th ed.
1980).
131. Confusion is especially apparent with regard to the prohibition against assertions
of generalized interests. Justice Powell, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, declared that the generalized-interest ban was "essentially" a matter of "judicial self-governance." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500. But Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), appears to treat the
ban as immediately deriving from a constitutional requirement of "injury in fact." Id. at
218-19. More recently, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), initially conceded that the distinction between constitutionally-required and prudential standing rules "has not always been clear." Id. at 471. As if to illustrate the point, Justice Rehnquist, after assigning concern about generalized interests to the "set of prudential
principles," id. at 474; see id. at 475, rejected the argument of plaintiffs that the first
amendment establishment clause itself legitimated their interest by grouping the interest of
plaintiffs with those judged in cases like Schlesinger and concluding, "That is not an injury
sufficient to confer standing under Art. III .

. . ."

Id. at 485.

One recent court of appeals decision construing section 437h(a) reflects the Supreme
Court's classificatory difficulties. In Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 689
F.2d 1006 (1982), petition for reh'g en banc granted, 689 F.2d 1016 (11th Cir. 1983), the
court concluded that plaintiffs suing as voters under section 437h(a) must meet the "minimum requirements" of article III. Id. at 1011; see id. at 1010-11 n.4. Although voting capacity satisfied the statute, it was otherwise an "untenable" basis for standing. Id. at 1013. Only
the voter's additional status as president of a company threatened with a Campaign Act
prosecution justified a finding of standing. Id. at 1013-14. The court concluded by permitting the company president to assert the rights of the company: "the general disfavor of jus
tertii claims is a prudential limitation.. . ...
" Id. at 1014.

132. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 487-88 n.24 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
133. The question whether article III limits congressional definitions of relevant interests for standing purposes sets in motion several lines of thinking in Supreme Court
opinions.
On one view, standing requirements are understood to be distinguishable from justiciability rules per se. Other justiciability rules measure the authenticity of a dispute,-originating in what is taken to be a primal constitutional command to avoid advisory
opinions. Standing requirements address other concerns. From this perspective, so long as
litigation involves appropriately authentic disputes, congressional redefinitions of relevant
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possible, though, that rather than make this concession, the Court
interests are nonproblematic. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972), illustrates this view:
Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. III federal courts to render advisory
opinions, . . or to entertain "friendly" suits, . . . or to resolve "political questions," . . . because suits of this character are inconsistent with the judicial
function under Art. III. But where a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether the litigant is a "proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue," ... is one within the power of Congress to determine.
Id. at 732 n.3 (citations omitted).
The effort to separate standing rules from other justiciability doctrines coexists readily
with a line of cases, emerging early but continuing into the present, which treats congressional recognition of "new" interests as presenting little problem in the context of legislation
either establishing the protection of such interests as part of the agenda of an existing regulatory regime, see, e.g., The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1924), or setting
up some new regulatory scheme in which the private actions that the scheme authorizes are
manifestly important to furthering the legislative purpose, see, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972). These cases represent the question of the
legitimacy of plaintiffs' interests as in a way already resolved by the remedial framework
Congress establishes in order to give these interests protection. "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury
would exist without the statute." Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973). The
congressionally-defined cause of action supplies a "legal" context in the same way common
law causes of action supply a similar context for more traditional interests. See, e.g., Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152-53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
The "cause of action" cases, however, become more difficult if inquiries into standing
are seen as interconnected with other aspects of justiciability doctrine-as part of the process of determining the "authenticity" of litigation. This interconnection is a characteristic
theme in many recent opinions: standing analysis becomes simply another variation on a
common concern. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472-74 (1982); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
493-94 (1974). It may appear, given this interdependence, that relaxation of standing rules
could be appropriately balanced through use of other justiciability measures. See Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-100 (1968). But changes in standing rules might also transform the
entire scheme, in ways inconsistent with constitutional objectives. See United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-97 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). In any event, this sense of
interconnection suggests that congressional additions to the list of appropriate interests
should not be viewed with merely a blank tolerance. The stability of the system requires
that such additions be tested in light of basic article III policies. See, e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court reveal efforts to embrace aspects of each of
these lines of thought. The conflict among the approaches thus becomes all the more apparent. For example, an awareness that recognition of relevant interests is the end-product of a
process of assessing the difficulties and uses of the causes of action that protection of such
interests would require carries over from judicial encounters with congressional interventions to the Supreme Court's characterizations of its own prudential rules. See, e.g., Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975). The same cause of action analysis, however, could in
principle encompass the "core" constitutional rules as well, see Garvey, A Litigation Primer
for Standing Dismissals, supra note 129, at 558, and thus might ultimately subvert the
constitutional "core"/prudential "periphery" model itself. See generally Albert, Standing to
Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE
L.J. 425 (1974). Or occasionally the Court's opinions relax recently-imposed strict pleading
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will continue to judge congressional standing grants-at least when
it can nonetheless uphold the grants-in light of traditional standing rules, without regard to the precise status of the usual rules, if
only as a means of encouraging congressional caution and avoiding
an ultimate constitutional question. In this light, Bread PAC and
California Medical Association together establish no doctrinal
proposition. Because the Supreme Court regarded section 437h(a)
as restricting standing in Bread PAC, no constitutional rituals
were necessary. And if the constitutional inquiry in California
Medical Association was thus little more than ritual, there is no
reason to suppose that in the next case after Bread PAC, when a
PAC member or functionary sues as a voter, Bread PAC will strike
the Supreme Court as reopening the California Medical Association issues. This means, of course, that our earlier suspicion was
correct. Bread PAC is indeed only ceremonial: simply a bow to
proper pleading.
What, finally, does all of this suggest? We can see, I think, the
virtue of simplicity. Once we question whether section 437h(a) is as
straightforward as Justice O'Connor insists that it is, we move into
a realm of argument in which our sense of the statute as decisive is
subject to repeated assault. The initial inquiry into whether statutory language is more sensibly treated as casual or precise becomes
an investigation of whether, and on what terms, legislative conflict
resulted in a committed or equivocal statute. This question turns
into an analysis of whether Bread PAC accomplished anything at
all at the statutory level or whether instead statutory construction
simply had the result of imposing certain pleading rules. And this
question itself expands, to become as well an investigation of
whether the Supreme Court's method of construction is also part
of a constitutional politics of bluff, involving the Court and Congress. In the end, we find ourselves sure of very little. Only this:
requirements, see supra note 116, in order (apparently) to portray congressional rights of
action as ultimately (if indirectly) protecting interests of more or less traditional form,
rather than as full-fledged departures from usual norms of "injury in fact." Compare
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374-75 (1982) (absence of misrepresentation
means no injury to white housing discrimination tester) with id. at 375-78 (permitting tester
to sue on basis of unelaborated allegation of infringement of interest in living in racially
integrated area). See also Gladstone, Realtor v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. at 115 (finding

implicit economic interest in claim of injury to interest in living in integrated area). Such
compromises, of course, do little more than preserve the basic tensions. The pressure may
be intensifying. Several lower courts have either openly recognized "radical" congressional
standing grants, see, e.g., Rite v. Costle, 650 F.2d 1312, 1319-22 (5th Cir. 1981), or laid
groundwork for doing so, see, e.g., National Treasury Employees' Union v. Campbell, 654
F.2d 784, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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statutory clarity and decisiveness in Bread PAC is largely artificial.
The statute itself asserts little; the Supreme Court's decision to
treat the statute as prominent pushes it forward only (or mainly)
as a front.
B.
In other cases, of course, statutory language and policy may in
fact be the inspiration and subject of judicial reasoning- identifying and expressing the values that judges regard as relevant. And
yet, however simple the opinions in these cases appear to be, the
underlying dynamic of commitment and hesitation may be as intricate as that in Bread PAC. Important statutes are (or become) ambivalent. They codify conflict rather than political consensus.
In United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement
Funds v. Robinson,1 84 the question was whether section 302(c)(5)
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947188 (the Taft-Hartley Act) prohibited a collective bargaining provision that distinguished, seemingly arbitrarily, between two classes of widows of
coal miners. Under the terms of the agreement, widows of miners
who had died prior to December 6, 1974, received increased health
benefits if their husbands, as of the time of death, were not only
eligible for retirement benefits, but had actually retired." 6 Widows
received no additional health benefits if their husbands, though eligible for retirement, had remained employed. 13 7 A divided panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that discrimination in these terms, however useful as a bargaining compromise, bore no relationship to the objectives of the pension fund. 138 The bargained provision therefore violated section 302(c)(5), which requires that pension funds operate
"for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees ..
134. 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
135. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 302(c)(5), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 157 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).

136. 455 U.S. at 567.
137. Id.
138. Robinson v. UMWA Health and Retirement Funds, 640 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 455 U.S. 562 (1982). Judge Robinson wrote for the court, id. at 417-24, Judge Davis
concurred, id. at 424-25, and Judge Robb dissented, id. at 425-26.
139. Section 302(c)(5) states in pertinent part:

The provisions of this section shall not be applicable .

. .

(5) with respect to

money or other things of value paid to a trust fund established by such [collective-bargaining] representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents . . . :Provided, That
(A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from prin-
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Stevens held that
section 302(c)(5) did not impose a reasonableness requirement restricting the range of classifications a collective bargaining agreement might employ in distributing pension benefits. "Its plain
meaning is simply that employer contributions to employee benefit
trust funds must accrue to the benefit of employees and their families and dependents, to the exclusion of all others."14 Legislative
history and surrounding statutory language suggested that section
302(c)(5) had only a narrow purpose. "The section was meant to
protect employees from the risk that funds contributed by their
employers for the benefit of the employees and their families might
be diverted to other union purposes or even to the private benefit
of faithless union leaders.

14 1

This "anti-siphoning" concern pro-

vided no basis for a "restriction on the allocation of the funds
among the persons protected by § 302(c)(5)."' 42
The error of the court of appeals, Justice Stevens thought, lay
in its assimilation of Robinson to cases "in which trustees of employee benefit trust funds, not the collective-bargaining agreement,
fixed the eligibility rules and benefit levels." ' Perhaps trustees, in
the exercise of a delegated discretion, acted unlawfully if they drew
arbitrary distinctions among beneficiaries. In this case, though,
[t]he ... trustees were not given "full authority" to determine
eligibility requirements and benefit levels, for these were fixed
by the 1974 collective-bargaining agreement. By the terms of the
trust created by that agreement, the trustees are obligated to
cipal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or
insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written
agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund,. . . and [such agreement] shall also
contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund ... ; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust ....
140. 455 U.S. at 570.
141. Id. at 571-72.
142. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 573. The cases the court of appeals most often cited fit Justice Stevens's
characterization. See, e.g., Norton v. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, 553 F.2d 1352 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Pete v. UMWA Welfare & Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc); Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir.
1968). But see infra note 152.
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enforce these determinations unless modification is required to

comply with applicable federal4 law. The common law of trusts
does not alter this obligation.,
'4
Section 302(c)(5) itself was not such "applicable federal law.' 1 5
No other statute imposed a pertinent restriction. 14" Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the trustees in Robinson acted properly in complying with the collective bargaining agreement.
Was Robinson really so easy a case? In interpreting section
302(c)(5), Justice Stevens attributed a notably modest purpose to
the statutory provision. He viewed section 302(c)(5) as no more
than a response to the specific problem to which members of Congress had referred in justifying the provision. We might with equal
plausibility, however, regard the immediate provocation of the
statute as instead illustrative of the general type of abusive practice that the legislation proscribed. Characterization thus becomes
a matter for choice. On one view, section 302(c)(5) addresses only
pension-fund looting-whether by unions (the immediate congressional concern) or perhaps by management as well. 147 Or alternatively, section 302(c).(5) addresses a larger category of pension-fund
misuse-any practice that works to the disadvantage of fund beneficiaries and that is not defensible in terms of fund objectives. 148
Looting obviously falls within this alternative category; but so does
a collective bargaining agreement that arbitrarily distinguishes between seemingly similar groups of beneficiaries. This more ambitious reading is entirely consistent with the language of section
302(c)(5). The statute does not refer narrowly to particular abuses,
but emphasizes instead "the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . .,. Justice Stevens might underscore the phrase

"sole and exclusive" as the statutory language carrying the purposive burden, and thus defend the narrower theory of the legislative

144. 455 U.S. at 573-74.
145. Id. at 574.
146. Id.
147. Cf. Note, The Duties of Employee Benefit Plan Trustees under ERISA in Hostile
Tender Offers, 82 COLUM. L. Rav. 1962, 1715-19 (1982) (discussing the applicability of

ERISA "sole and exclusive benefit" language-derived from section 302(c)(5)-as a constraint on role of pension funds in takeover contests).
148. Prior to Robinson, courts of appeals, dealing with trustee exercises of discretion,
did not simply rely on trusts principles in invalidating, for example, arbitrary eligibility
*requirements. Instead, these courts treated section 302(c)(5) as itself providing at least part

of the basis for their decisions. See, e.g., Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1971);
Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1968). These cases, of course, do not fit easily
within an anti-looting model of section 302(c)(5).
149. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 302(c)(5) (emphasis added).
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objective. It is clear, though, that section 302(c)(5) is open to interpretation. Neither "plain meaning" nor the statute's agenda of
concern dictates the Robinson gloss.
The Robinson critique of the analysis of the court of appeals is
similarly debatable. Justice Stevens assumes that the collective
bargaining agreement in Robinson functions as a trust instrument.
As such, the agreement is the first source of the obligations of the
trustees; general conceptions of fiduciary responsibility are relevant only insofar as the bargaining agreement is incomplete in its
instructions or otherwise grants discretion to the trustees. Provisions in the actual bargaining agreement in Robinson, however, appear to assume that a more complex, less peremptory dynamic describes the relationship of the agreement and trustee discretion.'" 0
More fundamentally, Robinson raises questions because, for Justice Stevens, the agreement effectively supplants not only usual

principles of fiduciary administration, but also section 302(c)(5) itself. Strictly speaking, of course, the agreement does not prevail if

it is plainly in conflict with the statute. But Stevens treats the
statute as relevant only if there is indeed such a conflict. And he
attributes so little content to section 302(c)(5) that it is hard to see
150. Article XX § (h)(5) of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974,
states:
The Trustees are authorized, upon approval by the Employers and the
Union, to make such changes in the Plans and Trusts hereunder as they may
deem to be necessary or appropriate.
They are also authorized and directed, after adequate notice and consultation with the Employers and Union, to make such changes in the Plans and
Trusts hereunder, including any retroactive modifications or amendments, which
shall be necessary:
(a) to conform the terms of each Plan and Trust to the requirements of
ERISA, or any other applicable federal law, and the regulations issued thereunder;...
(d) to comply with all applicable court or government decisions or rulings.
455 U.S. at 574 n.13. The first sentence of the provision appears to recognize a rather active
role for the trustees, one in which the trustees may initiate the process of modification, and
not simply react to the demands of the employers and the union. Given the more openended process the Wage Agreement thus apparently envisions, to hold (at minimum) that
the trustees were under a duty to propose redefining the beneficiary class in Robinson would
hardly contravene the Agreement; indeed, the Wage Agreement supplies a procedure for
accommodating the actual conclusion of the court of appeals that the trustees should have
refused to implement the bargaining agreement-a procedure available even if the later
quoted passages only refer (as Justice Stevens seems to hold that they do) to changes dictated by applicable statutes and regulations on their face.
Other bargaining agreements, in addressing pension questions, are even more deferential in their respect for trustee discretion. See, e.g., Toensing v. Brown, 374 F. Supp. 191,
199 (N.D. Cal. 1974), afl'd, 528 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1975) ("recommendation of the Collective
Bargaining Parties").
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(absent straightforward looting) how such a conflict would arise. " '
On an alternative reading, section 302(c)(5) might figure more
prominently. The trust instrument would now be an amalgam. Section 302(c)(5) becomes the primary document, establishing basic
principles; collective bargaining agreements serve a secondary purpose, as specifications or explanations of these principles. The
fiduciary obligations of the trustees, on this view, are initially creations of statute. A role for the trustees in monitoring the consistency of bargaining agreements, among each other and more importantly vis-a-vis statutory principles, becomes easy to see.152 The
151. See infra text accompanying note 170.
152. This approach would draw support from Toensing v. Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.
1975), and the cases that treat Toensing as persuasive. In Toensing, the court of appeals
upheld a vote of pension fund trustees to comply with the results of collective bargaining in
allocating pension benefits. The court, however, repeatedly noted the status of the collective
bargaining conclusions as merely "recommended increases." Id. at 72; see supra note 150.
The court also declared:
We wish to emphasize, however, that trustees have a duty to exercise their independent judgment in administering trust funds established under § 302 ....
Recommendations of collective bargaining parties may be adopted by the trustees in the exercise of their discretion, but such recommendations are not binding
or obligatory.
528 F.2d at 72. Subsequent courts have cited Toensing as support for the proposition that
pension fund administration is a process ordinarily distinct from collective bargaining. See,
e.g., Griffith Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 406, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105
(1982); Talarico v. United Furniture Workers Pension Fund A, 479 F. Supp. 1072, 1079-80
(D. Neb. 1979); see also Hawkins v. Bennett, 704 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1983) (The trust
fund is independent of the collective bargaining agreement). The court of appeals in Robinson relied on Toensing in arguing that the trustees could reject the bargaining agreement
allocation. Robinson v. UMWA Health & Retirement Funds, 640 F.2d 416, 423 n.51 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
Perhaps more significantly, the view of pension trusts as more creatures of statute than
of bargaining agreements is consistent with the characterizations of courts that have recently confronted the difficult problems involved in reconciling traditional rules and practices of collective bargaining with the obligations of congressional pension legislation. See
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) Pub. L. No. 93-406, 94 Stat.
1208 (codified as amended in various sections of titles 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, & 42 U.S.C., but the
sections under consideration in this article are located at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)) Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Acts of 1980 (MPPAA), Pub. L.
No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 26 & 29 U.S.C. (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); Robbins v. Prosser's Moving & Storage Co., 700 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1983) (en
banc); T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. v. Trucking Employees, 560 F. Supp. 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In
these cases, the manifest role of statutory regulation in fixing the factors that pension fund
trustees must take into account has prompted courts to treat as given the separateness of
pension fund and collective bargaining processes. These courts both acknowledge and insist
upon the exercise of discretion by trustees in determining their responses to collective bargaining politics. See Robbins, 700 F.2d at 433 (trustees need not exhaust bargaining agreement arbitration procedures); T.I.M.E.-D.C., 560 F. Supp. at 294 (trustees must make independent determination under MPPAA in deciding whether employer has shut down a plant
permanently-thus triggering pension fund withdrawal liability-or has simply closed the
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language of section 302(c)(5) itself supports this reading of the
statute as constitutive of the trust relationship rather than merely
regulatory. Section 302(c)(5) includes far more than the "sole and
exclusive benefit" rule. It identifies beneficiaries,"'s lists events
triggering payments and the generic forms benefits may take, 15 4 as-

signs to a "written agreement" (obviously secondary) the task of
specifying "the detailed basis on which such payments are to be
made,"'55 describes the procedures for administration of the
fund,' "6 and requires that payments to pension or annuity funds be
made to "a separate trust.' ' 57 The statutory provision, we can see,
performs many of the functions of a trust instrument."'
This subordination of the role of the bargaining agreement,

and reemphasis of both the statute and trust principles, also acquires support from the Supreme Court's decision in 1981 in
NLRB v.Amax Coal Co. '" 9 In Amax, the Court held that a union
did not commit an unfair labor practice by engaging in a strike in
furtherance of a demand that an employer refrain from insisting

on separate representation in the administration of a multiemployer pension fund. Operation of the fund was a process distinct
from the process of collective bargaining per se; the union therefore did not interfere with the employer's right to choose its own
bargaining representative.

60

Justice Stewart's majority opinion re-

plant for the duration of labor dispute).
153. "[Sluch payments are [to be] held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from
principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents
...." LRMA § 302(c)(5)(A).
154. Under section 302(c)(5)(A), benefits may be paid: "for medical or hospital care,
pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illnesses resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance

."Id.
155. LRMA 302(c)(5)(B).
156. Section 302(c)(5)(B) requires that (1) employees and employers be "equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of employees may agree upon.. ."; (2)
a described arbitration procedure be followed "in the event that the employer and employee
groups deadlock on the administration of such fund"; and (3) there be "an annual audit of
the trust fund" and "a statement of the results ... available for inspection by interested
persons. .. "
157. LRMA § 302(c)(5)(C).
158. See generally 1 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 46 (3d ed. 1967) (required contests of trust memorandum).
159. 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
160. "Both the language and the legislative history of § 8(b)(1)(B) reflect a clearly
focused congressional concern with the protection of employers in the selection
of representatives to engage in two particular and explicitly stated activities,
namely collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances.". . . The duties
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ferred specifically to section 302(c)(5) in order to establish its distinction between fund administration and collective bargaining
and emphasized that the statute established principles of trust law,
and not bargaining, as the ultimate regulator of the administrative
process. 161
Interestingly, Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter in Amax.
He observed that, under section 302(c)(5)(B), the administrators of
benefit funds are identified as "representatives of the employers"
or "representatives of employees"-and not as trustees.' 2 He also
described several questions of pension fund administration upon
which employer and employee representatives might differ, along
lines plainly paralleling usual divisions in collective bargaining. "
Stevens concluded that pension fund administration was often
simply another instance of collective bargaining, and employer rep16 4
resentation rights were therefore relevant.
There are, of course, ways of harmonizing Amax and
Robinson. "15 It should be clear, however, that Justices Stewart and
of an employer-appointed trustee of an employee benefit trust fund. . . are totally alien to both of these activities.
Id. at 338 (citation omitted).
161. See id. at 329-32. Justice Stewart also interpreted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, see supra note 153, as having "essentially codified the strict fiduciary
standards that a § 302(c)(5) trustee must meet." 453 U.S. at 332; see id. at 332-34. He
further noted that the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, see supra note 152,
"amended ERISA to impose new responsibilities upon the trustees of multiemployer trust
funds.. . ..." 453 U.S. at 334 n.17.
162. 453 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at 344-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 351-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, however, did not dispute that "representatives" engaged in pension fund administration assume "fiduciary responsibilities." Id. at 343. But he seemed to assume that fiduciary obligations acquired content chiefly in the context of the execution of duties specifically mandated by the "written
trust instrument." Id. at 346. "[Djiscretionary decisions" were as much or more matters of
bargaining. Id.
165. Arguably, Robinson complements Amax precisely. Amax sets up pension administration as a sphere distinct from the ordinary politics of collective bargaining. But administration, we may think, is a task very different from that of defining benefit levels in general.
Robinson gives institutional content to this distinction (1) by recognizing the authority of
collective bargaining with respect to pension benefit levels, at least insofar as bargaining
expresses itself through the bargaining agreement, and (2) by limiting the authority of pension administrators insofar as they purport to reject or modify the agreement. However elegant this formulation is, we might note that its distinction between bargaining and administration is not drawn so clearly in other areas of labor law, see, e.g., cases cited infra note 197
(varying approaches to duty of fair representation in grievance handling), and that the emphasis on restricting the bargaining process to negotiation of the agreement is reminiscent of
an analogy of bargaining agreements and contracts much in controversy, see, e.g., Feller, A
General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALiF. L. REV. 663 (1973). The
relevant point for purposes of this essay, however, is that, as the opinions of Justices Stew-
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Stevens, in writing for the Supreme Court in the two cases, took
very different approaches. In Robinson, Justice Stevens incorporated elements of the Amax analysis. He acknowledged the relevance of the law of trusts. But it became relevant (and here Stevens reads Amax narrowly, as no more than a rejection of his own
dissenting argument in that case) only if the bargaining agreement
first of all granted trustees discretion; a discretion fiduciary principles would then inform. 6' Justice Stevens would not acknowledge
that the law of trusts was in effect part of the statutory scheme.
Indeed, he pointedly left open the question whether fiduciary obligations as such provided a basis for federal causes of action. 6 " Presumably, the law of trusts was pertinent in cases like Robinson
only as a matter of state law, applying in the absence of pertinent
federal standards. "
art and Stevens permit us to see, the view of Amax and Robinson as clearly dividing spheres
of responsibility is not one that is necessary given statutory language. Moreover, as we shall
see, this reading, as other possible readings, implicates complex related questions of formal
interpretation and the underlying substantive politics of the statutory provision.
166. Compare UMWA Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 573 n.12
(1982) with id. at 573-74; see also supra note 164 (discussing Justice Stevens's dissent in
Amax).
167. 455 U.S. at 573 n.12.
168. Id. at 574; see, e.g., Ader v. Hughes, 570 F.2d 303, 306 (10th Cir. 1978); Associated
Contractors v. Laborers Int'l, 559 F.2d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 1977). Federal courts acquire jurisdiction "to restrain violations" of section 302(c)(5) under section 302(e), ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). There is a long
standing controversy among the lower federal courts about the limits of section 302(e) jurisdiction. See generally Goetz, Developing FederalLabor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans,
55 CORNELL L. REv. 911, 925-31 (1970) (the extent of federal court jurisdiction over trust
administration under § 302(e)). In Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1956), Chief Judge
Magruder raised the possibility that section 302(e) has the effect of "making the federal
district court into something like a chancery court for the enforcement of trust agreements
and the advice of welfare fund trustees." Id. at 114. He suggested that notions of "a 'protective jurisdiction' . . . or the creation of a body of federal common law of welfare trusts
(springing from the terms of § 302(c)(5)) could tie this jurisdiction to § 302 and thus legitimate it under Art. III." Id. at 114-15. Judge Magruder avoided resolving the matter by
adopting a pendent jurisdiction approach. Id. at 115-16. Subsequent cases reveal no agreement among federal judges concerning the Copra suggestions. See Associated Contractors,
559 F.2d at 226 & nn.7 & 8. Frequently, courts seeking to limit section 302(e) jurisdiction
restrict its reach to "challenges to the structural validity of a trust fund." Sheet Metal Indus. Trust Fund v. Commercial Roofing & Sheet Metal, 665 F.2d 1218, 1224 (D.C. Cir.
1981). "Structural" challenges, on a restrictive reading, would extend only to matters concerning the trust fund's compliance with statutory standards. Associated Contractors,559
F.2d at 225; see, e.g., Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1968); Collins
v. Trustees of Local 478 Trucking Pension Fund, 487 F. Supp. 520, 524 (D.N.J. 1980) (decision of trustees to increase benefits of some pensioners but not others is not a "structural
violation"). Courts adhering to this "structural" test, however, often interpret it "liberally."
See Sheet Metal Indus. Trust Fund, 655 F.2d at 1224 n.9. For example, one court has said
that "an eligibility requirement that arbitrarily excludes employees from benefits does not
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In Robinson, thus, the picture of a statute as a distinctive legal
entity plays a crucial, if background, role. Justice Stevens restricts
the relevance of fiduciary principles by subordinating these principles to the specific terms of a collective bargaining agreement. But
this subordination is hardly "natural." Both the overall organization of section 302(c)(5) and the specific statutory language under
scrutiny in Robinson provide support for a reversed orientation in
which fiduciary concerns constrain bargaining agreements. '6" Justice Stevens, however, encourages us to view fiduciary principles as
"alien"-as not themselves statutory in origin, as creatures of a
fully separate jurisprudence. The subordinate status of fiduciary
concerns thus becomes less surprising. The law of trusts, because it
is not part of the statute, can be relevant only insofar as it is made
so by the collective bargaining agreement. The law of trusts becomes an interpretive regime, working out the implications of the
arrangements the bargaining agreement sets up. Indeed, this separation of the statute and the law of trusts also adds to the plausibility of Justice Stevens's initial narrow reading of the language
and purpose of section 302(c)(5). 70 If trust concerns are statutorily
beside the point, the limited "antisiphoning" perspective that is
clearly present in the legislative history faces an only hypothetical
competitor.
This sense of statutory distinctiveness is not simply a rhetorical accident. To be sure, near the end of his Robinson opinion, Justice Stevens makes an argument that he obviously means to be
more pragmatic than formal. Arbitrariness, he claims, is perhaps
inherent in the benefit-setting process. "[B]ecause finite contributions must be allocated among potential beneficiaries, inevitably
financial and actuarial considerations sometimes will provide the
only justification for an eligibility condition that discriminates between different classes of potential applicants for benefits.

1 7'

The

collective bargaining process, therefore, may be better equipped to
operate for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees and therefore constitutes a
'structural defect' under § 302." Adams v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust
Fund, 670 F.2d 387, 397 (3d Cir. 1982) (citation omitted). Such broad readings of section
302(c)(5) in order to establish a statutory predicate for section 302(e) jurisdiction are in
substance equivalent to an acknowledgement of the Copra "common law" jurisdiction.
It appears that the Robinson opinion has only narrowly limited federal courts in their
references to a broad "structural" jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dudo v. Schaffer, 551 F. Supp.
1330, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Robinson limits scrutiny if eligibility requirements fixed by

collective bargaining agreement).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 151-58.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 140 & 147-48.
171. Robinson, 455 U.S. at 575.
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deal with distributive questions than rule-oriented judges. This
functional defense of the Robinson result, however, cannot be left
unqualified, as Justice Stevens himself acknowledged. Statutory
limits on the substance of collective bargaining agreements are
commonplace. 72 Legal regulation of line drawing is manifestly possible. In fact, in precisely the pensions context, "[tihe substantive
terms of jointly administered employee benefit plans must comply
with the detailed and comprehensive standards of. . . ERISA. ' 1 73
Judges are not always at a disadvantage vis-i-vis collective bargaining. Functional considerations become pertinent only in cases
like Robinson, in which no statute provides directly relevant "detailed and comprehensive standards." The practical argument in
Robinson thus incorporates the assumption of statutory distinctiveness. Because the statute in isolation provides no working material, "judicial review" is left with only "an undefined
4
standard.

17

In light of Amax, however, it is precisely this representation of
statutory language as freestanding or autonomous that undermines
the Robinson opinion. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Amax
notes the repeated use of the language of trusts law throughout
section 302(c)(5), and concludes that "Congress intended to impose
on trustees traditional fiduciary duties . . . . "7 "[Tihe future operations of all such funds would be subject to supervision by a
court of chancery.'

76

In other words, the statute itself makes the

law of trusts relevant-as a set of interpretive principles, not simply of use in giving content to pension provisions in bargaining
agreements, but pertinent as well in implementing the statutory
program. After reading Justice Stewart's opinion in Amax, we may
conclude that the doubt Justice Stevens expresses in Robinson
77
about the "federal law" status of trust principles is idiosyncratic.
Amax plainly treats the law of trusts in the labor pension context
as "federal common law"-its federal enforcement authorized (or
rather assumed) by the statute. The law of trusts and statutory
language, we may think, are not so separate as Justice Stevens depicts them. Each in differing ways supposes the other.
172. See id.
173. Id. For discussion of the significance of ERISA (and the MPPAA) in the interpretation of section 302(c)(5), see supra note 152.

174. 455 U.S. at 574.
175. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1981); see id. at 328-32.

176. Id. at 331.
177. But see supra note 168.
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If we take Amax seriously, Justice Stevens's opinion in Robinson seems to err in its underlying formal assumption. Section
302(c)(5) and the fiduciary principles of the law of trusts are not
wholly distinct, each to be analyzed or used in isolation. Section
302(c)(5) thus bears a greater resemblance to the substantive provisions of statutes like ERISA, which Justice Stevens acknowledged to be proper and manageable constraints on collective bargaining. Indeed, Justice Stewart in Amax describes section
302(c)(5) as a source of basic ERISA precepts."' Courts may draw
not only on the terse language of the statutory provision, but also
on the presumably rich accumulation of fiduciary precedent in
trusts law generally. Perhaps Justice Stevens is skeptical about the
actual usefulness of this trusts jurisprudence. But his skepticism, if
we believe Amax, places Robinson in conflict with the thrust of
section 302(c)(5) itself.
The conflict, however, may not be unique to Amax and Robinson. In Amax, Justice Stewart's references to statutory common
law and to statutory incorporation of traditional legal formulations
are familiar labor law devices. 179 But these devices are ones that we
particularly associate with the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947.180 This statute, politically famous as the Taft-Hartley Act,
amended the original National Labor Relations Act of 1935,181 and
in the process introduced into the 1935 Act elements in conflict
with the original provisions; elements that incorporate within the
National Labor Relations Act an acknowledgment of the opposition the original provision had stimulated."s ' In a variety of ways
the Taft-Hartley Act added to the National Labor Relations Act
mechanisms that complicate and constrain the original statutory
178. "ERISA essentially codified the strict fiduciary standards that a § 302(c)(5) trustee must meet." 453 U.S. at 332; see Note, supra note 147, at 1715-19 (describing duty of
ERISA trustees to act "solely in the interests of the participants" as expressing "the core
purpose of the statutory scheme" and interpreting ERISA standard in light of its origins in
section 302(c)(5)).
179. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957);
NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1958) ("general agency principles" apply "in
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors" under amended National
Labor Relations Act); infra note 185.
180. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
181. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
182. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (I), 61
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1947).
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program of recognizing and encouraging collective bargaining. 18a
Familiar examples include the statutory recognition of union unfair labor practices, 184 the substitution of traditional legal terminology for definitions that courts had previously interpreted to emphasize statutory purposes,1 85 authorization of judicial enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements against both management and
labor,"' as well as the famous restrictions on strikes18 7 and "closed
shops." ' An always opening question, a never closed controversy,
thus becomes part of labor law, simultaneously form and sub183. This was, emphatically, the conclusion of Professor Cox, writing shortly after enactment of the LMRA. See Cox, supra note 182, at 44-49; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947 (II), 61 HAnv. L. REv. 274, 313-14 (1948). But see infra
note 189.
184. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, in its first form, had listed in section 8
a series of unfair labor practices by employers. 49 Stat. 452 (1935). The Labor Management
Relations Act added a parallel subsection (b) to section 8, describing unfair labor practices
by labor organizations or their agents. See 61 Stat. 141-42 (1947). For the codification of
both provisions, see 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (as amended).
185. For example, the LMRA amended the original definition of "employee" in section
2 (3) of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), to add, inter alia, language excluding from the
definition "any individual having the status of an independent contractor," see 61 Stat. 138
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). This amendment
overruled legislatively a series of court decisions, epitomized by NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), in which the distinction between "employees" and "independent contractors" was tested less through traditional common law definition and more
through reference to underlying statutory policies. See Allied Chemical Workers Local No. 1
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971). If the Hearst approach survives at
all, it is only in cases in which common law rules are themselves ambiguous. See id.
I do not mean to overstate the significance of this shift. Common law rules as sometimes formulated identify as relevant many of the factors courts following Hearst had also
treated as pertinent. Compare Cox, supra note 182, at 7 (Hearst courts looked to various
considerations pertaining to "economic function" in addition to question of "control"-the
common law test) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (2)(a)-(j) (1958) (similarly
describing aspects of economic environment in addition to control). It is not clear, however,
whether federal courts, at least in recent decisions, look beyond the questions of control in
its several aspects. See, e.g., NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912, 919-20
(11th Cir. 1983). Independent contractor cases have sometimes generated remarkable patterns of indecision. See, e.g., Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d
862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("the NLRB [has] repeatedly reached diametrically opposite conclusions on the basis of virtually identical fact situations"). Such waffling is perhaps evidence that the statutory embrace of common law principles has denied courts and the
NLRB a guiding sense of programmatic bias.
186. LMRA §§ 301(a)-(b), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 156-57 (1947) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a)-(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
187. Id. §§ 206-10, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 155-56 (1947) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
188. The LMRA amended section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA to change the provisio permitting "closed shop" agreements, see 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935), to one authorizing "union ship"
(after-acquired membership) arrangements, 61 Stat. 136, 140-41 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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stance. To what extent should the amendments of the original
statutes be read modestly, in deference to the original scheme, or
rather strongly, as limits on that scheme? To what extent, in other
words, should we promote collective bargaining or, instead, regulate it. 189

Given the antagonism built into the amended National Labor
189. Perhaps these arethe wrong questions. Ms. Stone has suggested that, even as Professor Cox was skeptically cataloging the changes the LMRA had worked in labor law, he
was also sketching the outlines of a theory of "industrial pluralism," Stone, The Post-War
Paradigmin American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1511, 1514 (1981), emphasizing a view
of unions as no more than an institutional embodiment of employees, see Cox, supra note
182, at 46 ("there is still more truth in the philosophy which asserts that the union and the
employees are one than there is in the opposing view"), and an image of collective bargaining as a process informed at its best by a "voluntary acceptance of mutual responsibilities,"
Cox, supra note 183, at 313, with "roots in the ideals of self-rule and government according
to law," Cox, supra note 182, at 1. Notions similar to these, elaborated in a complex case law
and a rich theoretical literature, would supply the basis for a labor law jurisprudence in
which processes of ordering rather than the substance of conflict were (or are) the point of
departure-for critique and defense. See Stone, supra. If we accept this thesis, which gives
prominence both to developments in the years after the passage of the LMRA, and to anticipations in the earlier period, see id. at 1521-23, the conflict between the LMRA and the
original NLRA would appear to become less central. This con'clusion acquires additional
force if we take account of the work of Professor Klare, who has described in some detail the
ways in which courts initially interpreting the NLRA blurred the implications of that statute by reading it through the lenses of their usual legal theory. See Klare, JudicialDeradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,
62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). The opposition of the NLRA and the LMRA again loses a
distinctive importance; from the outset, it may seem, the NLRA was caught up in a process
of reaction.
It remains the case, I think, that this sort of extrapolation from the work of Stone and
Klare is crucially incomplete. There is in Cox's commentary on the LMRA, for example, not
only the beginnings of a picture of "industrial pluralism," but also, rather strongly, a sense
of a social and a legal transformation abruptly (and unnecessarily) cut short. See Cox, supra
note 182, at 46-47 (depicting changes in work environment "[w]hen the union comes"). The
Cox essays not only communicate a vision of an eventual labor law based on consensus,
pluralist accommodation, and legality; they also describe a scenario of then-present conflict,
in which "[t]he transition to a system of collective bargaining revolutionizes plant relationships, and therefore itself creates a period of unrest," id. at 49. A parallel counter-revolution
also emerges: "too many employers hope to preserve or return to the old regime." Id. at 2.
Cox himself sometimes sought to identify "a middle course," id. at 48, and criticized the
LMRA because of its "psychology of conflict," Cox, supra note 183, at 314. "Anything which
intensifies the conflict will increase the bitterness and resulting disturbances, and, in consequence, will prolong the period required to achieve harmonious relationships once recognition is gained." Cox, supra note 182, at 48. Nonetheless, the fact of conflict from which Cox
started, that he saw the LMRA as summarizing, and that my analysis has formally restated
in terms of the relationship of the NLRA and LMRA, remains worth noting. It is perhaps
one reason (among others) for the emergence of the industrial pluralism idea, but cf. Stone,
supra, at 1524 (emphasizing threat to collective bargaining posed by movement towards
compulsory arbitration); more importantly, it may serve as a reference point for approaches
to labor law that would treat conflict as less resolvable, and collective bargaining as a less
neutral institution.
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Relations Act, judicial decisions interpreting the Act often differ in
their emphases. The tension in the relationship of Amax and
Robinson reappears in other cases as well.190 Still, Amax and
Robinson are notable illustrations of this dissonant jurisprudence.
Seven Justices of the Supreme Court are able to agree with both
the use of trust principles by Justice Stewart to limit the sphere of
collective bargaining and the refusal by Justice Stevens to take
such principles seriously in order to enhance the role of bargaining.191 The equanimity of the concurring Justices may become
more comprehensible, however, if we note that, at least at the level
of results, neither case represents an unequivocal triumph for a
single point of view. Separately as well as jointly, Amax and
Robinson illustrate the opposing themes that organize the
amended National Labor Relations Act.
In Amax, Justice Stewart emphasized trusts principles in order to defend a union against an unfair labor practice charge arising out of a union effort to expand the agenda of collective bargaining. If we consider why the employer wanted separate
representation in pension administration, and take into account
the fact that the employer was a western mine operator, 92 we may
wonder whether, even if one employer motive was the subversion
of multiemployer pension funds, another was perhaps the longerterm goal of reducing the significance of multiemployer collective
bargaining as such within the coal industry, and thus bargaining
per se, at least in the newly developing western mines. If so, we
may conclude that Amax invokes trusts limitations on collective
bargaining but in the end also defends collective bargaining.
Robinson is similarly complex in its effect. Justice Stevens
190. One line of cases appropriate for this analysis might be the group of decisions

dealing with employer remedies in the event of wrongful strikes, whether in breach of collective bargaining agreements or otherwise. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 415
U.S. 401 (1981); Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U.S. 212 (1979); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398

U.S. 235 (1970). The first two cases deal with "wildcat" strikes and damages liability. The
latter two address union-directed strikes and injunctive remedies. Notwithstanding their
differentiating features, the cases confront the common question of the status of unions,

relative to both collective bargaining agreements and union members. The ambiguities and
hesitancies revealed in and among the Supreme Court's various opinions, we might think,
reflect (at least in part) a conflict revealed as well in the differing perspectives from which

the NLRA and the LMRA proceed.
A similar conflict is evident in the opinions of the Court in last Term's fair representation damages case, Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983).
191. Justice O'Connor was not a member of the Court at the time of Amax; Justice

Stewart was no longer a member as of Robinson.
192. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1981).
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shields collective bargaining from trustee or judicial review in a situation in which any tendency towards arbitrariness that such bar-

gaining possesses is most likely to be present. As Justice Stevens
notes, it is not just that benefit classifications are frequently artificial; the beneficiaries are not even represented in the bargaining
process. In Allied Chemical Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh

Plate Glass Co.,1" the Supreme Court held that retirees and their

families were not among the statutorily defined members of collective bargaining units."9e Justice Stevens refers to Pittsburgh Plate
Glass as though it explains rather than undermines the fairness of

the Robinson result:
There is no general requirement that the complex schedule of
the various employee benefits must withstand judicial review
under an undefined standard of reasonableness. This is no less
true when the potential beneficiaries subject to discriminatory
treatment are not members of the bargaining unit; we previously
have recognized that former members and their families may
suffer from discrimination in collective-bargaining agreements
because the union need not "affirmatively ... represent [them]
or. . .take into account their interests in making bona fide eco15
nomic decisions in behalf of those whom it does represent.'
Obviously, Justice Stevens is not arguing that Pittsburgh Plate
Glass establishes retirees as a class of outlaws or pariahs. Rather,

his underlying argument may be that, if Pittsburgh Plate Glass is
to retain significance, its exclusion of retirees cannot be offset by
recognition of a fiduciary duty that would indirectly supply retir-

ees with the same benefits as membership status. Or perhaps
greater benefits: in the duty of fair representation cases, the Supreme Court, again subordinating trust principles, 196 has in impor193. 404 U.S. 157 (1971).

194. Id. at 165-71. The Supreme Court ruled on the question for the purpose of determining whether an employer was under a "mandatory" duty to bargain with respect to
questions of changes in the pension benefits payable to already retired employees. Its ultimate holding that an employer is free, at least with respect to NLRB unfair labor practice
jurisdiction, to adopt unilaterally, during the term of a collective bargaining agreement, a
modification in its pension policy with respect to retired employees, see id. at 188, does not
mean that an employer cannot elect to negotiate such changes; nor does it mean that, if
unions choose to represent the interests of retirees in such "permissive" bargaining, the
unions are free of all forms of duty of fair representation, id. at 181 n.20.
195. UMWA Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1982)
(quoting Allied Chem. Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181
(1971)).
196. Concerning the similarity of the duty of fair representation and the duties of trustees, see Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588, 606 (1983) (White, J., dissent-
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tant cases seemed to define in rather weak terms the usual duty
that bargaining representatives owe to members of bargaining
units.19
But if Robinson is the child of PittsburghPlate Glass, we end
up with a reversed form of the Amax irony. PittsburghPlate Glass
is the quintessential Taft-Hartley case. Justice Brennan's majority
opinion portrayed the narrow definition of unit membership as the
work of the Labor Management Relations Act, a product of the
congressional effort to restore traditional legal definitions to labor
law and to limit the jurisdiction of collective bargaining.19 In
Robinson, thus, Justice Stevens celebrates collective bargaining,
but in ultimate service of the policy of restricting such bargaining.
In Robinson as well as in Amax, we can see, the statutory conflict
is implicit in judicial reasoning as well.
C.
Answers to the question of a statute's limits-whether the
statute indeed summarizes the appropriate criteria or concerns for
addressing a given problem-may vary, as in Robinson, depending
upon assumptions about whether the statute incorporates by reference some "other" legal regime. Judgments'about statutory reach,
however, are also sometimes frameable in terms more or less "internal" to the statute. This latter mode of proceeding is equally
capable of exposing underlying conflicts or uncertainties in a statute's substantive program. In the process, it may supply these conflicts or uncertainties with a distinctive form-a regular place in
the statute's jurisprudence.
ing in part).
197. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) ("A breach of the statutory duty

of fair representation occurs only when a union's unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith"). As the history of the Robinson case illustrates, an "arbitrariness" standard is not
inevitably weak. The standard may acquire an important procedural dimension, especially
in cases involving union processing of individual employee grievances. See, e.g., Vaca, 386

U.S. at 193; see also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 557-58, 571 (1976)
(duty of fair representation action possible, given allegations union failed to discover exonerating evidence for use in arbitration, if failure amounts to bad faith). Lower courts have
interpreted the Vaca standard, at least in grievance processing cases, with varying degrees
of rigor. Compare Superczynski v. P.T.O. Serv., Inc., 706 F.2d 200, 202-03 (7th Cir. 1983)
with Poole v. Budd Co., 706 F.2d 181, 183 (6th Cir. 1983). In cases involving challenges to
the substantive terms of bargaining agreements, however, the force of the arbitrariness stan-

dard would seem to diminish significantly, in view of judicial acknowledgment of the obligation of "the union . . . to balance the interests of all its constituents.
... Allied Chem.
Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 173 n.12 (1971).
198. Allied Chem. Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
166-68 (1971).
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Marine Bank v. Weaver,"'9 the case that provokes these comments, 0 0 arose as a result of efforts by Marine Bank officials to
minimize risks to which the bank was exposed because of the
financial difficulties of one of its debtors. Bank officials apparently
assisted the debtor, already in default on its obligations to the
bank, to obtain guarantors for a new loan from the bank. 0 1 The
guarantors purchased a $50,000 certificate of deposit from the
bank and pledged the certificate as collateral securing the guarantee. 102 The debtor promised the guarantors one half of its net profits, as well as $100 per month, for the duration of the guarantee;

the debtor also agreed to allow the guarantors to use (at the
debtor's discretion) a barn and pastureland owned by the
debtor. 0 3 The guarantors obtained the right to veto future borrowing by the debtor. 0 4
Allegedly, bank officials told the guarantors that the proceeds
from the new loan would serve as working capital for the debtor.20 5
In fact, however, the bank required the debtor to use almost all of
the proceeds to cover prior bank loans.2 0 e The debtor subsequently
initiated bankruptcy proceedings.0 7 The guarantors sued Marine
Bank,20 8 invoking rule 10b-5,209 an antifraud prohibition promul199. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
200. The statutory conflict in the background of Marine Bank is not entirely "internal." Competing theories at times incorporate references to an "outside" legal regime-for
example, the common law of fraud. These references, though, define only some of the several elements of the competition. See infra text accompanying notes 249-78.
201. 455 U.S. at 553-54. The debtor was an unincorporated meat packing company.
Marine Bank was apparently not receiving regular payments on $33,000 in outstanding
loans. Moreover, the debtor had substantially overdrawn its checking account. Marine Bank,
as creditor, had perfected the usual array of security interests. Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637
F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). The question of the extent to which
Marine Bank had dealt with the guarantors was contested by the bank, 637 F.2d at 159-60,
but because the case arose on appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of
Marine Bank, the reviewing courts based their analyses on the allegations of the plaintiff
guarantors.
202. 455 U.S. at 552-53.
203. Id. at 553. The guarantors, as described by the court of appeals, "were farmers
engaged in auctioning livestock"; "[a]ged 79 and 71 respectively, they had no formal education beyond the eighth grade, and had spent their lives as cattle farmers." 637 F.2d at 159.
204. 455 U.S. at 553.
205. Id.
206. "The proceeds of the $65,000 loan were forthwith disbursed to repay loans and
overdraft obligations to the Bank approximating $42,800, to pay past due federal taxes, and
to pay past due obligations to trade creditors. That left approximately $3,800 for working
capital." 637 F.2d at 159.
207. The debtor filed its bankruptcy petition four months after receiving the loan. Id.
at 159.
208. "Although the bank had not yet resorted to the Weavers' certificate of deposit at
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gated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.210 In federal district court, however, Marine Bank succeeded in its motion for
summary judgment. 211 The district court ruled that, even if the
bank acted fraudulently, it did not do so "in connection with a
purchase or sale of a security," thus rendering the Exchange Act
(and rule 10b-5) inapplicable.212
Reversing a divided panel of the Third Circuit of the United
States Court of Appeals,2 13 a unanimous Supreme Court agreed

with the district court. The certificate of deposit that the guarantors obtained and then pledged was not itself a "security" within
the sense of section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act. " "[T]he purchaser of a certificate of deposit is virtually guaranteed payment in
full, whereas the holder of an ordinary long term debt obligation
assumes the risk of the borrower's insolvency. 2 1 5 Nor was the
agreement between the guarantors and the debtor an "investment
contract" or some other form of security. "The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in prior cases involved offers
the time this litigation commenced, it acknowledged that its other security was inadequate
and that it intended to claim the pledged certificate of deposit." 455 U.S. at 553-54.
209. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
210. 48 Stat. 891 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. Section 78j(b) (1976)).
Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
211. 455 U.S. at 554.
212. Id.
213. Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 158-65 (3d Cir. 1981); id. at 165-70 (Weis,
J., dissenting).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see infra note 220.
215. 455 U.S. at 558.
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to a number of potential investors, not a private transaction as in
this case." '
I would guess that the casual reader of the opinions in Bread
PAC and Robinson is persuaded. Justices O'Connor and Stevens
make the cases look like easy matters of statutory application. Difficulties become apparent only upon close examination. Marine
Bank, however, is notably unpersuasive on its face. The propriety
of the way in which the bank engineered the transaction is obviously the crucial question in the case. We might expect that even a
threshold inquiry into statutory applicability would attach at least
some significance (one way or another) to the bank's maneuvers.
Within the Supreme Court's approach, however, the bank's conduct never becomes pertinent. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Burger analyzes the status of the certificate of deposit by characterizing the certificate generically. He refuses to consider the use to
which the certificate is put in the particular case 17 and emphasizes
instead the risk-free dimension it possesses in the abstract. Similarly, Chief Justice Burger isolates the agreement between the
guarantors and the debtor. Highlighting its peculiarities, he assimilates the agreement to an ordinary personal contract, bearing little
resemblance to standard images of financing transactions.'
The
bank's crucial role as intermediary fails to appear in either part of
Chief Justice Burger's discussion.
The Supreme Court's statutory analysis as such underscores
the apparent sidestep. Unlike the Bread PAC and Robinson opinions, Marine Bank does not purport to treat statutory language as
decisive on its face; section 3(a)(10) itself figures in the Court's discussion only occasionally.' Indeed, Chief Justice Burger notes
that the section 3(a)(10) list of types of securities is both "quite
broad"" 0 and open to adjustment if "the context otherwise re216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 559.

Id. at 559 n.9; see infra note 233 and accompanying text.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 555 & n.3, 556-57, 558-59, 559 (all are brief references only).
Id. at 555. Section 3(a)(10) states:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires...
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement or
in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general,
any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
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quires. ' ' 2 ' He also recognizes that the statutory term "investment
contract" is a placeholder for a functional or contextual assessment
of "unusual instruments.''2 Statutory language, it appears, in no
way "compelled" the Court to ignore the specifics of the case.
Is Marine Bank simply an incompetent piece of work, one that
(remarkably) all nine Justices were willing to tolerate? It is, I

think, a more interesting case than this conclusion would suggest.
The Supreme Court's decision to judge separately the two instru-

ments is of a piece with an underlying theme in the statutory language-although it takes some effort to see the parallel. The case
remains controversial. But we can see that what is difficult in

Marine Bank has its origin in a conflict in statutory language, and
exposes a basic tension in the substantive premises of securities
law as well."5
Each of the two parts of the Supreme Court's opinion suggests

elements of the explanation:
First, it is very clear that in Chief Justice Burger's discussion
of the certificate of deposit the organizing perspective is comparative-the Chief Justice is undertaking a choice of law analysis. If a
certificate of deposit is risk free, it is because the certificate is "iscurrency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days
of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976 &
Supp. 1981)), defines "security" in terms that, for present purposes, are interchangeable
with those of section 3(a)(10). But cf. Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the
Securities Acts, 39 U. CM.L. REv. 362, 397-400 (1972) (discussing significance of differing
treatment of "notes" in §§ 2(1) and 3(a)(10)). In Marine Bank, Chief Justice Burger viewed
the two definitions as "essentially the same." 455 U.S. at 555 n.3. He cited cases interpreting
section 2(1) as also applicable to section 3(a)(10). Id. at 555-56. I will follow the same approach. The relationship of the Securities Act and Exchange Act also figures prominently in
my ultimate assessment of Marine Bank. See infra text accompanying notes 260-71.
221. 455 U.S. at 558-59; see id. at 556.
222. Id. at 559. Chief Justice Burger emphasized the importance of context in attempting to limit the significance of the Marine Bank decision:
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement between
transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a "security" as defined by the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated
on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended
to be served, and the factual setting as a whole.
Id. at 560 n.11.
223. The problems involved in defining the term "security" for purposes of federal securities law are the subject of an extensive case law and a considerable commentary. For an
interesting critical summary, see Dillport, Restoring Balance to the Definition of Security,
10 S.c. REG. L.J. 99 (1982). There is a useful historical account in Long, Introduction,Student Symposium-Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security: Some Pragmatic
Considerations,6 ST. MARY's L.J. 96 (1974).
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sued by a federally regulated bank which is subject to the comprehensive set of regulations governing the banking industry." 2 4 The
fact that a certificate is risk free is decisive not so much because a
"security" is supposed to be a risky investment (although there
may be a trace of this idea in Chief Justice Burger's thinking as
well), 22 5 but because risk-free status is a sign that a legal regime

other than securities law is already in place, rendering securities
law superflous. "It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under the federal banking laws. "022
Second, the organizing perspective in Chief Justice Burger's
discussion of the arrangement between the guarantors and the
debtor is also comparative. But now the reference is not (at least
initially) to competing legal regimes but to different sorts of transactions. In distinguishing between "private" and "commercial"
dealings,' 227 Chief Justice Burger seems to be of the view that "securities in the commercial world"'2 2' are not so much contracts set-

ting up relationships as species of property.2 Securities are in origin contractual, but the contract rights they describe are typically
224. 455 U.S. at 558.
225. One traditional test for determining the presence of a security has involved an
emphasis on "risk capital." The point of securities laws, it has been said, "is to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or another." Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal.2d 811, 815, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89, 361 P.2d 906,
908-09 (1961). The Supreme Court, however, has not employed the "risk capital" test as an
explicit means of analysis. See, e.g., United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
857 n.24 (1975).
226. 455 U.S. at 559. The Supreme Court's refusal in Marine Bank to recognize a security, due in part to the existence of "another" legal regime governing the transaction at issue
is consistent with the Court's earlier decision in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551 (1979). In Daniel, the Court, noting the then-recent enactment of ERISA,
observed: "The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and terms of
employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts
to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans." Id. at 569-70. See also United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 841, 859 n.26 (1975) (noting extensive state involvement in financing and planning of low cost co-op housing development and concluding that
question of whether federal law should displace "the extensive body" of state regulation
requires a more specific answer from Congress than the securities laws provide).
227. 455 U.S. at 559.
228. Id.
229. See also Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089
(1981); cf. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical,Neoclassical,and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U.L. REv.854 (1978) (discussing differences in contract governing discrete transactions and that regulating long-term
relationships).
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alienable: of value without regard to the identity of the holders,
and therefore both readily reproducible and usually transferable.
In prior cases, "instruments found to constitute securities" were
the subjects of "offers to a number of potential investors"; 3 0 they
"had equivalent values to most persons and could have been
traded publicly."231 By contrast, the peculiarities of the Marine
Bank deal-the barn and pasture provision as well as the
veto-identify the arrangement as a "unique agreement" that "was
not designed to be traded publicly. 232
230. 455. U.S. at 559.
231. Id. at 560.
232. Id. In previous decisions, the Supreme Court had not seemed to give a similar
priority to considerations of marketability-at least in the sense of the susceptibility of an
instrument to resale. In two leading early cases, the Court classified instruments as securities without considering the resale question at all. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293
(1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). The withdrawable capital
shares in a savings and loan institution at issue in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332
(1967), were nonnegotiable, although assignable, under' Illinois law, see id. at 337; the Supreme Court nonetheless regarded the shares as securities, declaring nonnegotiability to be
beside the point: "This simply reflects the fact that such shares are not a usual medium for
trading in the markets. The same can be said for the types of interests which we found to be
securities in Howey and Joiner," id. at 343. But see id. at 339-40 (stressing transferability).
In Marine Bank, the court of appeals relied heavily on Tcherepnin as support for the conclusion that the certificate of deposit was a security. See Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d
157, 164 (3d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). Its discussion, however, did not focus on
resale potential, and Chief Justice Burger, similarly ignoring the question at this point, distinguished Tcherepnin by noting the greater (unregulated) risk involved in the investment
at issue in that case. See 455 U.S. at 557; supra text accompanying notes 224-26. Finally, in
the two cases preceding Marine Bank in which the Supreme Court held that the instruments at issue were not securities, its opinions either attached no significance to the fact
that the instruments were not readily marketable, see International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (pension rights), or viewed resale potential as simply one among
several relevant factors, see United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851, 854
(1975).
Chief Justice Burger's focus on the "uniqueness" of the Marine Bank transaction (with
respect to the arrangement between the debtor and the guarantors) is somewhat more consistent with earlier cases. The Court had previously noted mass marketing aspects in the
offering of particular instruments, either for the purpose of treating the characterizations of
promoters as themselves decisive, see Joiner, 320 U.S. at 346, 348-49, 351, 352-53, or in
order to demonstrate the degree to which the return on investment depended on the acts of
the issuer, and not the purchaser, see Howey, 328 U.S. at 295-96 & n.2, 300. The clearest
precedent for the Marine Bank approach, however, is to be found not in the Supreme
Court's earlier decisions, but in a recent essay by Professor FitzGibbon. See FitzGibbon,
What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participatein the Financial
Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893 (1980). Chief Justice Burger explicitly refers to FitzGibbon's
work only once, as support for the hardly controversial proposition that the Exchange Act
"was adopted to restore investors' confidence in the financial markets." 455 U.S. at 555 &
n.4. Nevertheless, the substance of the Court's analysis, at least insofar as it emphasizes the
particular instruments, their potential marketability, and the disqualifying effect of their
unique features, parallels FitzGibbon's argument almost precisely.
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The two parts of Chief Justice Burger's analysis, we can see,

are not entirely separate. The distinction between commercial and
private transactions seems to explain Chief Justice Burger's abrupt

refusal, in discussing the certificate of deposit, to analyze the certificate as pledged.23 Arguably, Chief Justice Burger insists on
evaluating only the generic certificate because taking into account
variations in use would relocate the discussion outside of the commercial sphere-the realm of standardized, freely exchangeable
complexes of rights. Conversely, there is a choice-of-law assumption implicit in the commercial/private distinction. Chief Justice

Burger does not mean to leave "private" transactions legally unregulated. Congress, however, "did not intend to provide a broad
federal remedy for all fraud."2

4

Perhaps traditional actions for

fraud would be better able to bring out the salient aspects of the
2 35

highly individualized transactions in Marine Bank.
Marine Bank thus might rest on the following proposition: Securities law takes as its subject transactions that, whatever other
relevant features they must also possess, involve (at minimum)
transfers of contractual rights of an impersonal, freely alienable
236
sort that are not otherwise subject to detailed legal regulation.

This formulation accounts for the Supreme Court's decision to assess separately the two written instruments and emphasizes as well
233. "We reject respondents' argument that the certificate of deposit was somehow
transformed into a security when it was pledged, even though it was not a security when
purchased." 455 U.S. at 559 n.9.
234. Id. at 556.
235. But see infra text accompanying notes 259-71.
236. This formulation omits any reference to the Howey test-"whether the scheme
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). The Supreme Court
initially framed this test as simply a summary of a settled state law definition of "investment contracts." Id. at 298-99. The Court came to regard it, however, as a "shorthand form"
for "the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security." United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); accord International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.11 (1979). But see Dillport, supra note 223,
at 115 (not clear Forman intended for Howey to be universally applicable). See also infra
note 238. In Marine Bank, the court of appeals held that the agreement between the debtor
and the guarantors resembled a Howey investment contract sufficiently closely to make out
a jury question-the open issue was whether the right to use the barn and pasture "was a
primary rather than an incidental purpose of the transaction .

. . ."

Weaver v. Marine

Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). Chief Justice Burger
stated the Howey test, see 455 U.S. at 559, but did not apply it. Instead, he immediately
took up the discussion of marketability. See id. at 559-60. Arguably, even if the Howey
standards were met in Marine Bank, Chief Justice Burger may have been setting up the
requirement that instruments be marketable as an additional, perhaps even prior, demand.
Or perhaps the Howey test is now in disfavor; it has been criticized as more conclusory than
instructive. See, e.g., FitzGibbon, supra note 232, at 898-907, 948.
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the features of those instruments that the Court saw as removing
the Marine Bank transaction from within the range of securities
law. The pertinent statutory language, we might think, favors this
approach. Section 3(a)(10) consists mostly of a list of the various
contractual arrangements classifiable as "securities.

28 7

Notably,

this list seems to take for granted the fact of abstraction or reification. It does not refer to transactions directly, but deals only with
instruments. 23 8 We might imagine a statutory definition characterizing a "securities transaction" in functional terms, without reference to summarizing legal instruments-but this is not the format
section 3(a)(10) follows.""9
The language of section 3(a)(10) does introduce two complicating factors. At least at first glance, however, the statutory difficulties appear to be manageable. Not all the types of arrangements
that section 3(a)(10) lists are in fact traditional financial forms.4 0
"Investment contract" is a catchall term that opens the way,
within the framework of the list, for a functional inquiry. 241 And
yet, it is surely not difficult to argue that "investment contract" is
as much a reification as the other arrangements on the list.'' "In237. See supra note 220.
238. Section 3(a)(10)'s (or its 1933 Act analog's) form as a list of instruments has introduced an element of confusion into the case law. Justice Jackson declared in Joiner, in
referring to the list, that "[i]nstruments may be included within any of these definitions, as
matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description." SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943); see id. at 355. Jackson's dictum (Joiner did not
involve such an instrument) seemed to suggest that any instrument bearing on its face a
section 3(a)(10) name, e.g., "stock," was a security. The Supreme Court rejected this idea in
Forman, indicating that, although an instrument's name might be relevant, see United
Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850 (1975), it was also necessary that "the
underlying transaction embod[y] some of the significant characteristics typically associated
with the named instrument." Id. at 851. Forman, we might think, ran to the opposite extreme, and made the fact of listing largely irrelevant insofar as Justice Powell proclaimed
the Howey test to be "essential." See id. at 852; supra note 236. See also International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 n.11 (1979) (essentiality of Howey test one reason
for not considering whether pension right was a "certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement").
239. This point has been made both by critics of the enumerative approach, see, e.g.,
Long, supra note 223, at 100-01, and by critics of the critics, see, e.g., Dillport, supra note
225, at 120; FitzGibbon, supra note 232, at 908-11.
240. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
241. Although the Howey Court treated "investment contract" as a term of settled definition, see SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946), it described that definition as
one aiming at widespread relevance: "It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle,
one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of others on the prorhise of profits." Id. at 299; see also
supra note 236.
242. Interestingly, although "investment contract" is a catchall, the Supreme Court, in

19831

LEGAL IMAGINATION

vestment contract" thus carries with it the connotation (in common with the other listed forms) of abstraction and alienability, of
susceptibility to exchange and thus legal enforcement without regard to the identity of the parties or the specific context of the
transaction. Secondly, the section 3(a)(10) list is qualified by the
introductory phrase, "unless the context otherwise requires . ..."
But if we recall that section 3(a) is a compendium of definitions for
use in reading other parts of the Exchange Act, we can see that the
reference to "context" does not so much point directly to the facts
of a given transaction, but rather calls attention to the dynamics of
particular Exchange Act provisions (perhaps illuminated by the
facts of the particular case), and to the changes these provisions
may require in the general statutory definitions. " ' If "context"
means "legal context" rather than "factual context," a choice-oflaw awareness of the Marine Bank sort may seem appropriate as a
threshold means of determining whether aggressive or extended
enforcement of an Exchange Act provision is indeed necessary. "
All of this exegetical effort attempts to supply some credibility
for Marine Bank by demonstrating that Chief Justice Burger's
opinion rests on assumptions of a piece with statutory presuppositions. But the Supreme Court's analysis remains vulnerable to critapplying the Howey standard, frequently refers to the term "investment contract" as
though it defined a distinct financial entity. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967) ("Of the
several types of instruments designated . . . by § 3(a)(10) . . ., the petitioner's shares most
closely resemble investment contracts"). This is, we may suspect, a reflex carryover of the
underlying theme of the statutory list.
243. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969). The National Securities
Court refers to section 3(a) generally. In the specific setting of section 3(a)(10), however, it
has seemed to several commentators that courts dealing with the status of notes erred in
treating "context" as a reference to the economic environment in which an instrument is
put to use. See, e.g., Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Law Coverage of Note Transactions:
The Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1567, 1577 (1980). Some of the leading cases discussing the status of notes reveal careful efforts by judges to ground their references to the
financial context in an initial discussion of essentially statutory matters. See, e.g., Exchange
Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131-32, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976); C.N.S.
Enter., Inc. v. G. & G. Enter., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
825 (1975). More minimally, other opinions connect the discussion of financial context with
the judges' view of statutory purpose. See, e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689,
694-95 (3d Cir. 1973). Of course, economic context may become relevant in assessing the
applicability of the listed categories internal to section 3(a)(10) itself. See, e.g., Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 338-39 (1967).
244. But see Schwartz, Re-Defining "Securities" Limitations on the Scope of the Securities Laws, in 2 FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 697, 712
(P.L.I. 1982) (arguing that choice-of-law awareness is irrelevant for "garden variety securities" and noting that in Marine Bank "both the issuer and the instrument were subject to
regulation").
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icism. Ironically, this criticism is in essence an intensification, a
more detailed working out, of the themes Marine Bank raises.
The starting point is the conflict built into the statutory definition of a "security." The body of section 3(a)(10) takes the form
of a list, but the status of the list is put in question by the introductory qualifier, "unless the context otherwise requires . ..

."

Section 3(a)(10) in a sense proclaims a lack of definitiveness in its
own definition. The conclusions we may draw, for example, about
free exchange and abstraction (conclusions inferred from the form
of the list) can be no more than tentative, until we determine what
"the context" indeed "requires." In principle, the particulars of the
section 3(a)(10) list, as well as the very idea of ostensive definition-of listing-is open to challenge.
As we have seen, "context" in section 3(a)(10) refers primarily
to the particular substantive Exchange Act provision at issue. In
Marine Bank, the relevant context would be that established by
rule 10b-5, and through it, section 10(b). There is, however, no investigation in Marine Bank itself of the definitional implications of
rule 10b-5 and section 10(b). Instead, in the certificate of deposit
discussion the existence of an alternative legal regime, already in
place, is decisive. Apparently, securities law provisions and policies
are automatically preempted. And in the analysis of the agreement
between the guarantors and the debtor, the commercial/private
distinction serves as a similar threshold screen. In light of the language of section 3(a)(10), something in the jurisprudence of rule
10b-5 and section 10(b) should justify the terms of the Court's
analysis, if Marine Bank is indeed to be consistent with the statutory organization. Notably, the Supreme Court makes no effort to
establish the link.
Or perhaps, as context, rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) are blank.
Section 10(b), after all, does little more than authorize the SEC to
adopt rules dealing with fraudulent practices in connection with
securities trading. 245 The relevant legislative history is minimal. It
simply confirms what the face of the statute suggests: Section
10(b) is a catchall clause, enabling the SEC to proscribe whatever
manipulative schemes warrant attention in addition to those
245. See supra note 210. The Supreme Court, however, has stated that the reference to
"manipulative or deceptive device" in section 10(b) prevents the SEC from adopting rules

that impose liability if traditional common law fraud rules, or at least the traditional scienter requirement, would not permit a finding of liability. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). But cf. infra note 272.

1983]

LEGAL IMAGINATION

banned by the Exchange Act directly. 4e Although the SEC has
sometimes used this authority to promulgate quite specific rules, 47
rule 10b-5 is not one of them. The language of the rule is extremely general, permitting its use as an all-purpose means of policing marketing deception. 4" Neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5,
it might seem, suggests very much about whether the section
3(a)(10) list, with its usual implications, is appropriate. Presumably, therefore, in Marine Bank, there was no reason not to work
with the list after all.
The litigative setting of Marine Bank reminds us, however,
that rule 10b-5 transcends its legislative and administrative origins. The rule supplies the predicate for a private right of action,
recognized by federal courts notwithstanding the absence of any
express statutory sanctions. 4 9 And in the process of giving content
to this action, the courts have had repeated opportunities to fill in
the legislative and administrative blanks. 50 If there is anything
about rule 10b-5 or section 10(b) that would count as "context" for
section 3(a)(10), it would be this judicial gloss. And in fact, the rich
accumulation of rule 10b-5 case law is highly instructive. Specifically, two larger movements of ideas are visible in the midst of the
elaborate mass of specific holdings and particularized subrules.
From one of these viewpoints, sometimes emphasizing the
common law vocabulary of section 10(b), as well as the absence in
statutory language of any specific provision for a differently set-up
private right of action, the essential attributes and concerns of rule
246. The Ernst & Ernst Court drew its conclusions about the relevance of common law
fraud notions primarily from the failure of statutory language or legislative history to suggest reasons for rejecting the analogy, and from language in other statutory provisions.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-11 (1976).
247. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1983) (setting conditions for "all or nothing"
offers).
248. See supra note 209.
249. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975) (summarizing history of rule 10b-5 right of action). "When we deal with private actions under Rule
lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn ....
[Ilt would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5." Id. at 737; see also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 808-09 (5th ed. 1982) (placing implied right under rule 10b-5 in context of recent implication decisions).
250. But cf. Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand PrivateRights, 95 HARv. L. REv.
1193, 1289-1316 (1982) (frequently skeptical discussion of implied rights of action as one
means for "beneficiaries" of administrative regime to extend law enforcement beyond an
agency's own program).
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10b-5 are those of the traditional fraud action.2 51 Assessments of
alleged rule violations posit, and then attempt to verify, the existence of a deceptive statement occurring within a highly personalized setting. Emphasis falls on the state of mind of the individuals
involved, 52 on the nature of their relationship,'53 and on the immediacy of the causal connection between misrepresentation and
4
5

injury.2

The other perspective begins with the common law fraud
model, but modifies the usual elements of the fraud action on the
basis of a "systematic" or "functional" analysis.' 5 On this view,
the residual role of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, as legislatively
and administratively established backups for other more specific
regulatory provisions, suggests that the specific features of the rule
10b-5 action should depend in important part upon the context in
which rule 10b-5 is brought to bear-upon which aspect of the
251. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228
(1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
252. The scienter requirement, which addresses the nature of the defendant's state of
mind, is well-known. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). The state of
mind of a plaintiff may also become relevant, for example, if litigation puts in issue plaintiff's "due diligence." After Ernst & Ernst the "due diligence" inquiry often involves questions of recklessness rather than mere negligence. See, e.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615
F.2d 68, 77-79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d
1005, 1013-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
253. The Supreme Court's recent "duty" cases, see Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255
(1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), involve government-initiated actions
rather than private suits. But in both Dirks and Chiarella,the Court treated decisions involving private and government actions as equally pertinent. See, e.g., Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at
3261 & n.14, 3265 n.22, 3267-68 n.27; Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227-28 & n.9; see also Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-95 (1980) (Ernst & Ernst scienter rule applies in SEC lob-5 action-although not in all SEC actions under § 17(a) of the Securities Act). Dirks and
Chiarella illustrate how the implied right of action case law in the rule lob-5 context helps
to fix the framework within which section 10(b) itself or SEC administrative policy are understood. See also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979)
("On a number of occasions in recent years this Court has found it necessary to reject the
SEC's interpretation of various provisions of the Securities Acts"). But see infra note 258.
254. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 249, at 1044-57 (reliance and
causation).
255. The clearest illustrations of the functionalist approach appear in the extensive
commentary discussing insider (or similar) trading. Analysts frequently assume that, to an
important extent, judgments about the propriety of rules limiting exploitation of informational advantages reflect views about the operational needs or normative implications of the
securities markets in which information would be used. See, e.g., Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. Rv.
322, 326-33, 355-57 (1979); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REv. 1, 29-55 (1980); Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 309, 330-38.
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larger statutory structure the rule is put to use to protect. This
approach is most obvious in cases involving allegedly fraudulent
acts that occurred within the setting of an established securities
market. Federal courts have, for example, substituted analysis of
the materiality of misrepresentations for direct investigations of
plaintiff reliance,2 5 6 emphasized policies of deterrence and disgorgement as well as individual compensation, 25 7 and treated systematic factors like "market equity" as pertinent in fixing the content of the rule 10b-5 action.2 58 The common law fraud model is
plainly not the inspiration for judicial work of this sort. The objective and impersonal character of public securities markets,2 and
the perceived importance of investor confidence in market integrity, 260 are seemingly the decisive influences.
Although these two approaches are sometimes in conflict in
the rule 10b-5 case law, they coexist comfortably in the Marine
Bank setting. The common law fraud model emphasizes precisely

the concerns that are pertinent in the highly individualized Marine
Bank affair. Whether bank officials knowingly misrepresented the
future uses of the loan proceeds, whether the guarantors in truth
256. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976); see also Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HAv. L. REv. 1143,
1148-53 (1982) (collecting cases).
257. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 170-73 (2d Cir. 1980).
258. "[T]he Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information .... SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); accord, e.g., Shapiro v.
1968), cert. denied sub noma.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974). The "market
equity" theory of insider trading regulation did not have its origin in judicial reactions to
private litigation. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). Indeed, insider
trading regulation under rule 10b-5 may be more a product of SEC enforcement action than
of private litigation. See Dooley, supra note 255, at 16-17, 55. Nonetheless, courts and commentators working with ideas of "market equity" and insider trading tend to frame their
analyses as though the private action were primary; as though the nature of the relationships among market participants was the key. This tendency has worked both to favor and
to undermine insider trading doctrine. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 3260-64
(1983); Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 240; Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on
Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule
10b-5?, 54 S.CAL.L. Rav. 1217 (1981). The title of Professor Wang's ambitious article summarizes the analytical paradox: markets are "impersonal" and yet inquiry proceeds in terms
of the traditional litigative formula for describing the relationship of particular opposing
parties.
259. See, e.g., Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
10b-5, 88 HAsv. L. REv. 584, 592-96 (1975).
260. See, e.g., Symposium: Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009, 1010 (1966)
(comments of William L. Cary) ("integrity in the capital markets is essential for mass
capitalism").
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relied on bank representations, whether the guarantors were seeking a safe investment or rather gambling-factors like these seem
highly relevant for judging liability in Marine Bank, and they are
also factors a traditional fraud action would seek to illuminate.
In the Marine Bank setting, moreover, the alternative model
would counsel a similar approach. The systematic perspective does
not assume that all trading in securities takes place through public
marketing. It simply suggests that, in cases involving such trading,
judicial enforcement of rule 10b-5 should reflect the twin efforts of
the Exchange Act, evident in both statutory language and legislative history, to regulate and support public securities markets. Of
course, no public trading was at issue in Marine Bank. From the
systematic point of view, therefore, the question would become
whether any provisions of the Exchange Act address private securities transactions. The shape and objectives of the rule 10b-5 action
in this new setting should derive from these statutory terms.
At this point, the complexity of the Exchange Act's structure
becomes pertinent. Through legislation and disclosure rules governing traded securities, 6 certification requirements for market
institutions and professionals, 22 and various prohibitions,2" the
statute addresses problems involved in maintaining "fair and honest" securities markets.2 " But the Exchange Act also sets up what
is effectively a second system of regulation drafting, by creating
the SEC2 e and delegating to that agency, in provisions like section
2 6
10(b), important rulemaking and adjudicatory responsibilities. "
Rule 10b-5 represents an exercise of this authority. Under the Exchange Act, the range of this second legal regime extends beyond
the scope of the Act itself. For example, the SEC acquires responsibility for superintending the administration of the 1933 Securities Act," 7 legislation specifically regulating offers of new issues of

securities.2" The Securities Act, in imposing its own battery of registration, disclosure, and antifraud rules, also recognizes exceptions from its requirements, including an exception for transac261. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA), ch. 404, § 12, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982)).
262. SEA §} 15, 19 (codified 'as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78s (1982)).
263. SEA }§ 9, 11 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78k (1982)).
264. SEA § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982)).
265. SEA § 4 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982)).
266. See also SEA § 23 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1982)).
267. See SEA § 210 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ii (text omitted) (1982)).
268. See Securities Act of 1933 (SA), ch. 38, § 4, 5, 48 Stat. 74, 77-78 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d, 78e (1982)).
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tions "not involving any public offering.

'269

This statutory

withdrawal, however, is incomplete. Notably, it does not extend to
antifraud rules. 70 Moreover, SEC and judicial efforts to define
what is "not . . . any public offering" often seem to imagine a
transaction very much like that which the common law fraud action also treats as archetype-individualized, equal-footed, direct
dealings. 7 1 In a setting like Marine Bank, the Securities Act provisions appear to supply the relevant context for rule 10b-5. The language of the rule itself certainly covers "new issues" trading as
much as any other securities transaction. These provisions, we may
conclude, both acknowledge a place for a securities antifraud rule
in situations analogous to that in Marine Bank, and ratify resort,
at least in this context, to the common law model as well.

Rule 10b-5, therefore, is hardly a blank background, without
implications for purposes of applying section 3(a)(10). Indeed, if
we take rule 10b-5 seriously as context, much in Chief Justice Burger's analysis in Marine Bank is open to question. On either view
of rule 10b-5, Burger errs in his effort to portray the commercial/

private distinction as one measure of the limits of federal securities
law. The rule 10b-5"action is entirely capable of illuminating the
personal or individual elements in a transaction-in every case
under the common law approach; and at least in cases like Marine
Bank under the systematic approach. Recent Supreme Court decisions enthusiastically preach the continued viability of the common law model.2 7 It cannot be, therefore, that the "private" as269. SA § 203 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982)).
270. Section 4 of the Securities Act exempts designated transactions from the prohibitions of section 5 of the Act, which make it unlawful to deal in unregistered securities or to
disseminate an unapproved prospectus. SA §§ 4, 5 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d,
77e (1982)). Section 4's exemption does not extend to sections 12(2) and 17(a), the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 Act itself. See id. §§ 12(2), 17(a), 48 Stat. 74, 84-85 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1976)). Nor does the section limit the reach of
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) extends its prohibition of
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" to include not only misrepresentations "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange," but also securities transactions involving "any security not so registered."
SA § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1982); see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683,
688 (1983) (section 10(b) protections are "available to all persons who deal in securities").
271. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 249, at 235-58 (transaction
exemptions available to issuers of securities).
272. See cases cited supra notes 251 & 253. I do not mean to claim that every recent
Supreme Court decision characterizes the rule 10b-5 right of action in terms entirely consistent with the common law fraud model. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), refused to treat common law analogies as necessarily controlling. "[T]he typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation
and deceit evolved was light years from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule
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pects of a transaction mark it as outside the range of securities law.
Moreover, if we accept a place for the traditional fraud action
within securities law, Chief Justice Burger's reference to banking
law's established and thus preemptive protection of certificates of
deposit is also vulnerable to criticism. Given the fraud action, we
cannot simply declare the pledge of the certificate to be an irrelevant "personalizing" detail. We must ask whether federal banking
law works, as the securities fraud action would, to reduce the risk
of the pledge itself. The answer, rather obviously, is that federal
banking law does not address this crucial aspect of the Marine
Bank transaction.27
But where does this leave us? The ways in which section
3(a)(10) and rule 10b-5 undermine Chief Justice Burger's particular arguments reveal little, it may seem, about the shape of a more
appropriate analysis. The critique of the commercial/private distinction established only that the legal "context" in Marine Bank
is consistent with recognition of a "security." Under section
3(a)(10), however, departure from the standard list presupposes a
genuinely insistent context-one that "requires" rather than
merely tolerates adjustment.2 7 And even if federal banking law
10b-5 is applicable." Id. at 744-45. Justice Rehnquist, however, was responding to the argument that common law requirements equivalent to the statutory purchaser/seller rule were
eliminated in the late eighteenth century. Id. at 744. Justice Rehnquist defended his rigid
reading of the purchaser/seller rule by noting that it responds to concerns that common law
actions resolved automatically. Within the ordinary field of common law application, "privity of dealing or. . . personal contact between potential defendant and potential plaintiff"
was commonplace. Id. at 745. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983),
Justice Marshall displayed a similar skepticism, holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than the traditional rule of clear and convincing evidence, defines
the burden of persuasion in a rule 10b-5 action. "Reference to common law practices can be
misleading, however, since the historical considerations underlying the imposition of a
higher standard of proof have questionable pertinence here." Id. at 691; see id. n.27. In an
earlier part of the Huddleston opinion, Justice Marshall had held that a plaintiff could
bring a rule 10b-5 action in the event of misrepresentations in a registration statement, even
though such misrepresentations were also the explicit subject of a right of action defined by
section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1967). Id. at 690. The overlap was tolerable, Justice Marshall explained, at least in part because section 11, while limiting the list of
possible defendants, imposed either strict liability or a version of negligence liability. See id.
at 687, 690 n.22. By contrast, rule lOb-5 governed a broader class of defendants, id. at 690
n.22, but required proof of scienter, see id. at 688-89. Thus, the conformity of rule lOb-5 and
the common law fraud action figured prominently in Justice Marshall's initial statutory construction, even though Justice Marshall rejected the common law analogy subsequently.
273. Statutory provisions setting up the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation address
questions relating to the financial "soundness" of insured banks, and not the fairness of
bank dealings with particular customers. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32 (1982). See generally
Clark, The Soundness of FinancialIntermediaries,86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976).
274. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137-38 (2d Cir.
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possesses no analog to rule 10b-5, and thus cannot protect the
holder of a certificate of deposit against a misinformed pledge,
there remains the true common law action for fraud. In the Marine
Bank setting, presumably, this is a source of protection equally as
good as rule 10b-5.17 ' The implications of its list, we may think,
override section 3(a)(10)'s introductory qualifier. A "security,"
whatever else it must be, is at minimum an instrument describing
impersonal, readily exchangeable complexes of rights. Nothing in
Marine Bank or rule 10b-5 "requires" that we set aside this initial
proposition.
This conclusion, however, comes too easily. The Securities Act
distinction between "public" and "private" offerings does more
than simply identify differing sets of transactions to which rule
10b-5 might apply. The Securities Act requires us to develop a
view of the relationship of these two marketing forms. Both are
subject to statutory regulation (albeit to differing degrees), and
this extension of coverage presumably reflects some idea about
what "public" and "private" offers have in common. Judicial and
SEC efforts to elaborate and apply the distinction suggest elements of at least two such "connecting" theories. These theories, it
turns out, supply starting points for alternative assessments of the
Marine Bank result.
On one view, regulation of private offers is prophylactic. If the
extensive disclosure requirements for public offerings are not to be
evaded through ostensibly private transactions, private offers must
be subject to a regime of definition and regulation in order to assure that securities transactions adopt the form that is true to
their nature. From this perspective, private offers provoke suspicion. The working definition of such offers, as a result, will be quite
narrow. The regulatory aim should not be to encourage such transactions, but to ensure that private offerings escape the full force of
statutory obligations only when such offerings manifestly possess
1976).

275. In addition to their federal claims, plaintiffs in Marine Bank also raised claims of
violations of the Pennsylvania Securities Act and of common law fraud. 455 U.S. at 554. The
Supreme Court left open the question whether, after its decision that federal securities law
was irrelevant, a federal district court might nonetheless retain pendent jurisdiction in order
to adjudicate the state law claims. Id. at 561. On remand, the court of appeals held that

pendent jurisdiction would not lie, but that the district court, pursuant to a Pennsylvania
statute, could transfer the action to a state court without endangering the viability of plaintiffs' suit given state statutes of limitations. Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744 (3d Cir.
1982).
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none of the features the statute seeks to control.7 6
The second view holds that private offers deserve statutory
protection to much the same extent as public offers. From this perspective, securities law is sensitive to, and indeed seeks to have an
impact upon, the underlying dynamics of capital raising within the
economy at large. Public and private offers are means through
which capital moves to firms seeking to expand the scale of their
activities or to alter the characteristics of their financial obligations. These two methods for obtaining funds are alternatives, not
only to each other, but to other devices for securing access to capital-devices, for example, taking the form of traditional debtor/
creditor relationships with financial intermediaries. Arguably,
"public" and "private" offers frequently differ, not only with respect to the types of firms that find such offers useful, but also
with respect to the sorts of investors to whom the offers appeal.
The appropriate regulatory response is one that seeks to maintain
the integrity of both public and private offers, regulating in the
interests of investors, but attempting as well to avoid measures
that would cause one or another of the offering firms to become a
meaningless option, so encumbered by regulatory hazards or costs
2
as to be of little use. 7
The prophylactic theory of private offer regulation justifies
recognition of a federal antifraud remedy in place of a similar state
action on protective grounds 278-as a means of policing (and per276. "The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offerees for the protections
afforded by registration." SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953). Ralston
Purina initiated a line of cases in which the question of the need for registration was restated as an inquiry, for example, into the information available to offerees and into the
financial sophistication possessed by the offerees. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Management
Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902-04 (5th Cir. 1977). These cases provided the foundations for former
rule 146-an SEC effort to define a "safe harbor" transaction clearly exempt from registration requirements. Concerning rule 146, see Soraghan, Private Offerings: Determining "Access, " "Investment Sophistication," and "Ability to Bear Economic Risk," 8 SEC. REG. L.J.
3 (1980).
277. Emphasis on protecting the private offer as an independently significant means of
business fundraising emerged as part of the debate over the usefulness of rule 146. See, e.g.,
Campbell, The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of 1933: PracticalForeclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DuKz L.J. 1139. Regulation D, recently adopted by the
SEC as a replacement for rule 146, appears in large part to be a response to capital market
concerns. See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 251, at 260-75.
278. The analogy is to those cases in which federal courts take, or Congress grants,
jurisdiction over apparently "state law" questions in order to protect background federal
interests. See generally Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction,57 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 933
(1982). With respect to private offers, of course, the inquiry is not strictly jurisdictional. The
question is not whether federal courts should enforce state law, but whether they should
limit or extend federal law.
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haps thereby discouraging) private offers that may be substitutes,
individually or as part of a larger series of transactions, for offers
that would otherwise take the public form the Securities Act chiefly regulates. In Marine Bank, the pertinent arrangements neither
involved a disguised public offer nor created instruments likely to
enter into subsequent public trading. Under the prophylactic theory, the Marine Bank deal was not one that triggered federal concerns. There was no reason to override the conclusion suggested by
the section 3(a)(10) list; no reason to find a "security." Whatever
2 79
fraud took place could be left to state law.
By contrast, within a regulatory regime sensitive to differentiated capital markets, the Marine Bank matter would be of real
interest. The facts reveal an effort to bring "new money" into a
business, albeit through the indirect route of the guarantee, without resort either to a public offer (or more relevantly) the creation
of a true debtor/creditor relationship. The guarantors did not behave like creditors. They were obviously putting funds at risk in
expectation of profit. The appeal of the deal could not have derived primarily from the safety of the guarantee investment, but
from the possibility of an open ended return. It is easy, in other
words, to characterize the guarantors as investors. The role of the
bank in brokering the arrangements increases our awareness that
the case involves an effort to tap an "alternative" capital market.
Firms often make use of private offers because of rigidities perhaps
inherent in debtor/creditor transactions with financial intermediaries. That reason was certainly present in Marine
Bank-it describes precisely the motivation (of either the debtor
or bank officials) for soliciting the guarantors (the indirect source
of funds). The bank's alleged self-interested abuse of its broker's
role triggers a central concern of the capital markets perspective. If
plaintiffs are correct, the bank prevented the debtor from setting
279. At first glance, bankruptcy law, and not securities law, seems to be the more pertinent legal regime for purposes of federal judicial scrutiny of the Marine Bank transaction.
The bankruptcy rules concerning preferential transfers, however, as well as associated prin-

ciples deriving from the law of fraudulent conveyances, address transfers of the debtor's
property. In Marine Bank, the certificate of deposit that the guarantors pledged was their
property, and not the debtor's. From the bank's perspective, that was the whole point of the
pledge. Marine Bank thus may resemble the standby letter of credit cases. Creditors' rights
are rearranged without accompanying changes in a debtor's holdings. See, e.g., In re M.J.

Sales & Distribut. Co., 25 Bankr. 608, 613-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Page, 18 Bankr. 713,
715-16 (D.D.C. 1982). Moreover, even if the proceeds of the second loan were recovered for
the debtor's estate, and, passing over various timing questions, etc., the guarantor would
seemingly remain subordinate to the other creditors, whose claims would presumably be
reactivated, and thus the guarantor would gain nothing.
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up a genuine alternative to the already established debtor/creditor
relationship. Instead, the private offer simply became the means
through which the bank, by in effect diverting the guarantor's
funds, fully secured its position as creditor. There is plainly a role
here for a federal antifraud action-to protect the integrity of the
private offering mechanism in a situation obviously open to duplication in which the private offer is vulnerable to abuse. On this
view, therefore, we might very well give priority to the "context
. . . requires" proviso in section 3(a)(10), set aside the list, and
recognize a "security."
We should take the Marine Bank discussion through one more
stage, in order to provide some basis for choosing between the prophylactic and capital market approaches to private offer regulation. But this effort would quickly become a full-scale analysis of
securities law generally. Moreover, the relevant question here is
not the "correctness" of the result in Marine Bank. Instead, the
conflict in the language of section 3(a)(10), the competition between the two theories of rule 10b-5, and the diverging views of
private offer regulation are all of interest in themselves. All describe points within the larger structure of the Exchange and Securities Acts at which initially narrow questions of statutory construction quickly become matters that require interpreters to
undertake a simultaneously formal and substantive reading of the
statutory regime as a whole. The larger politics of securities regulation thus acquires a sequence of ostensibly limited skirmish sites.
If this larger politics is controversial (as we all know it to be), the
particular fights that express it are unlikely to become settled. The
function of statutory construction, however, may not be to restore
peace-but to impress upon a statute's readers the nature of the
combat in which they find themselves participants.
V
The analysis of the arguments of Radin and Landis at the outset of this essay and the just completed investigation of the three
Supreme Court opinions were in part efforts to establish the plausibility of the idea that statutory form is literally subject to construction. The work of construction not only yields an image of a
given statute, it also may be instrumental in fixing the values of
the interpreter. Statutory constructions are helpful artifacts-ways
of representing, and therefore of both expressing and opening to
criticism, the interpreter's point of view. The relevance of statu-
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tory constructions for legal inquiry should be apparent. Sensitivity
to the formal qualities that interpreters attribute to statutes may
be crucial, for purposes of either description or assessment, in even
the most substantively motivated enterprise.
This essay suggests no more than a starting point for a reoriented theory of statutes. A proper study of the intellectual history of statutory interpretation would obviously take up writers in
addition to Radin and Landis. Three cases are a manifestly inadequate sample for an examination of the attributions organizing judicial references to statutes. There are, moreover, important questions that this essay has not even begun to discuss.
For example, a truly comprehensive account of statutory constructions should explore not only judicial reactions to statutes but
also judicial responses to the efforts of other interpreters. Administrative agencies and executive officials act on the basis of particular conceptions of statutes-as indeed do legislatures, not merely
in adopting a particular statute, but also in reacting to the statute
subsequently, in the course of codification or the passage of additional legislation. Judges may ignore or reject the work of these
"other readers," defer to that work, or take some intermediate
tack. Perhaps we should regard judicial responses to institutional
issues of this kind as simply another part of the process of construction. But perhaps there is also an important constitutional issue here, one that the introductory effort of this essay suggests as
well.
Once we acknowledge that statutes figure as always under construction rather than somehow complete, is it possible to give priority to the work of any one participant in the process? If not, are
competing interpretive institutions caught up in circles of irresolvable hermeneutic clash? Is there a way, in the end, to regard such
conflict as other than chaotic? Traditional constitutional images of
separation of functions, of balance, of spheres of competence and
the sense of comity, seem less relevant. What new images are
available?
This essay itself supplies no more than a primitive vocabulary
for characterizing statutes. It should be possible, however, to enrich or add to notions of "relaxed" or "rigorous" statutory language, to pictures of statutes as separate from or incorporating
"other" legal regimes, or to accounts of statutory structures as representing substantive conflicts by setting up seemingly "narrow"
questions in "widening" terms. To this end, we may need to confront statutes directly, to conduct a series of exercises in which we
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build up a sense of statutory features. For example, what notable
features link or distinguish the statutes adopted by Congress in
1825? In 1875? In 1925? In 1975? Are there significant differences
in the appearance of congressional statutes as we jump these fiftyyear intervals? Is there, in other words, a history of statutory
form? Efforts to answer questions like these might strengthen our
capacity to recognize the shadings and shifts in the work of statutory interpreters, and thus might increase our ability to restate the
formal element in statutory constructions in substantive terms. As
one result, questions of institutional relationships may perhaps become open to more nuanced formulations. We might be able to discern, in the structure of particular statutes, both concessions and
challenges to given hierarchies of readers. For example, important
statutory conflicts might express themselves (in more detailed
ways than I have described in this essay) through the emphases a
statute gives to other legal regimes-other statutes, constitutional
law, common law, administrative practice, etc.280 These references,
we may conclude, suggest as corollaries views concerning the relative importance of interpreters of the statute who would bring to
bear the perspective of these "other" materials. The priority of judicial interpretation, of an agency's view, of the legislature's own
expectations, or of the revised assumptions of subsequent legislation, would thus enter into controversy. The controversy, however,
would no longer (or at least not routinely) degenerate into a contest of slogans-anarchy and hierarchy. The status of interpretations would become an issue of a piece with the question of a statute's substance.
In any event, it is hypotheses and projects such as these that
this essay suggests. Their plausibility (or implausibility) is one
measure of the essay's success (or failure) in achieving its introductory ambitions. It should seem as though something should follow.

280. This perspective is more or less the reverse of the Hart and Sacks approach. See
supra notes 3, 66.

